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INTRODUCTION
The problem of inconsistent judgments on the same claim or
issue no longer exists-in theory-thanks mainly to the law of res
judicata. True, Edward Coke long ago lamented the "contrarieties of
Ziff Professor of Law, Cornell University. I would like to thank for fruitful
exchanges Sam Baumgartner, Zachary Clopton, Stdphanie Francq, Bob Hillman,
Rosalie Jukier, Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Jeff Rachlinski, Stewart Schwab, Harumi
Takebe, Barry Vasios, and the participants in Cornell Law School's summer
faculty workshop.
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verdicts and judgments one against the other."' But if the problem
did still exist, it would be serious. First, society now recognizes an
efficiency interest in avoiding inconsistent adjudications. At best,
inconsistency would erode faith in our system of justice and diminish
acceptability of its output. At worst, inconsistency would put a party
into an impossible situation of conflicting obligations. Second, any
decrease in the certainty and stability of repose would create
inefficiency. Society has an interest in increasing certainty for the
purposes of primary conduct; once a court determines legal relations,
we all need to be able to act in the world with assurance that those
relations are indeed fixed to some known extent. Society also has an
interest in increasing stability in the judicial system; we all benefit
when courts treat prior decisions, from the same or other courts, with
respect and comity. Third, fairness further argues for equal treatment
in similar circumstances, and for furtherance of reliance interests by
consistently adhering to prior adjudication.2
One of the obvious purposes of our res judicata law is to
minimize the possibility of inconsistent judgments. 3 However, the
doctrine cannot completely eliminate that possibility. On the one
hand, res judicata must be raised in the subsequent action by the
party who seeks to take advantage of it.4 If that party fails to assert
the preclusive effect of the former adjudication, a judgment may be
rendered in the subsequent action that is inconsistent with the former
judgment. On the other hand, inconsistent judgments can result even
when the party entitled to rely upon the initial judgment does assert
it, but the subsequent court erroneously or willfully refuses to give it
preclusive effect, or correctly refuses under its own conflicts law.
The subsequent court may assert that some requirement of res
judicata is lacking or some exception applies, and the resulting
relitigation may then produce a different outcome.
Picture a Mississippi plaintiff who loses a judgment to a New
York defendant in New York (Forum #1 or F-1). The plaintiff needs
a more favorable forum. For that purpose, she brings an action upon
the same claim in Mississippi (F-2). Mississippi disdains New York
values and so refuses to recognize, or give effect to, the New York
judgment, holding it unworthy of full faith and credit. Proceeding to
the merits, the Mississippi court gives judgment for the plaintiff. This
1. Ferrer v. Arden (1598) 77 Eng. Rep. 263, 266; 6 Co. Rep. 7a, 9a (CP).
2. Cf John C. McCoid, II, Inconsistent Judgments, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
487, 488-91 (1991) (suggesting some of the following costs are often overstated).
3. ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK
ON ITS THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 31, 33 (2001).
4. Id. at 237.
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denial of full faith and credit is unconstitutional,' so the defendant
appeals, unsuccessfully. Finally, the plaintiff decides to go back
nearer the defendant's home in pursuit of assets for enforcement,
suing upon her Mississippi judgment in New Jersey (F-3).
Thus we encounter "inconsistent judgments," defined in the
sense of F-1 and F-2 judgments, between the same parties or their
privies, that differently decide the same claim or issue and that would
each independently be preclusive in a new action in F-3. To be
preclusive, both prior courts had to render valid and final judgments
that are recognizable by F-3, where "valid" roughly means no more
than that the rendering court possessed jurisdiction and afforded
notice.6 Besides this specific hypothetical, many different
circumstances can generate inconsistent judgments.
When inconsistent judgments do come about, how should the
law handle them? Under the well-known rule followed in the United
States, when there are two inconsistent judgments, it is generally the
later judgment that is entitled to res judicata effects.' That is, if by
failure to assert or apply res judicata two inconsistent judgments are
rendered, then the one later rendered has the controlling preclusive
effects.' This somewhat arbitrary practice is called the last-in-time
rule. It forms part of our constitutional doctrine of full faith and
credit.9
So our New York defendant will have to pay in New Jersey.' 0
Full faith and credit means that F-3 must bow to an erroneous, even
unconstitutionally erroneous, judgment by F-2, and thus give no faith
5. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908) (holding that Mississippi
cannot reject a sister-state judgment on the basis of local policy).
6. See infra note 120.
7. See Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518 (1986) (giving
strong support for the last-in-time rule in the federal-state-federal setting).
8. On the meaning of "rendered," see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 14 (AM. LAW INST. 1982) ("For purposes of res judicata, the
effective date of a final judgment is the date of its rendition, without regard to the
date of commencement of the action in which it is rendered or the action in which
it is to be given effect.").
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 114 cmt. b (AM.
LAW INST. 1971) ("The rule ... is based upon principles of res judicata and of full
faith and credit.").
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 15 cmt. c, illus. 1 (AM.
LAW INST. 1982) ("A sues B on a promissory note. B denies that he executed the
note. There is a trial resulting in a verdict for B, and judgment is rendered in B's
favor. A brings a second action against B on the note, and B defaults, and
judgment is given for A for the amount of the note and interest thereon. Thereafter
A brings an action against B on the second judgment. The judgment for.B in the
first action is no defense.").
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and credit at all to F-I's judgment. Shocking? Now imagine that F-2
is a foreign nation:
Suppose, for instance, the first judgment is an
American judgment. If the second action takes place
in Graustark, in the Graustark action one of the parties
relies on the American judgment, the Graustark court
says, "We will not give any credit to the judgment of
an imperialist court," and so the Graustark court just
rides over the American judgment.
In that case it seems rather doubtful to me
whether in the third action, which takes place in this
country again, the court should prefer the Graustark
judgment to the American judgment."
Whatever the rationales for applying the last-in-time rule
domestically, should an American F-3 ever prefer a foreign F-2
judgment to an American F-1 judgment?
Part I of this Article will lay out the range of application of
the last-in-time rule under current law. Part II will question the basis
for that rule. Part III will argue for proper limitations on the reach of
the rule. The journey is worthwhile because considering how this
rather technical problem has been and should be resolved reveals
depths of not only res judicata and conflicts theory, but also of the
legal process entailed in effectuating that theory.
I. PROBLEMS OF INCONSISTENT JUDGMENTS
These problems of inconsistency arise in a variety of
circumstances. These problems also involve the whole range of res
judicata, and the last-in-time rule applies throughout.
Repetitive litigation of a claim can occur when the plaintiff
sues again to obtain a better outcome. More commonly, the plaintiff
may sue again to seek enforcement elsewhere. Alternatively, the
defendant may put the claim back in court by pursuing declaratory or
11. 41 A.L.I. PROC. 277 (1964) (Prof. Rudolf B. Schlesinger). This passage
comes from the transcript of the American Law Institute's debates on what would
become RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 114 (AM. LAW INST.
1971). Graustark is a fictional country near Romania that was the setting for
several novels by George Barr McCutcheon, including BEVERLY OF GRAUSTARK
(1904).
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injunctive relief from the judgment or its enforcement. 12 Repetitive
litigation of an issue can occur when the same issue arises in
subsequent litigation, often in the course of a different claim. The
issue could constitute part of the merits, or it could be a threshold
issue such as jurisdiction.
The parties' incentives that result in inconsistency can cover
a broad range. They may fail to raise res judicata as a result of
default, out of ignorance, or by way of litigation strategy where one
or both parties seek a fresh adjudication. Knowing that some law of
res judicata will be in play also can shape strategy, especially
through forum-shopping.
Sometimes the genesis of the problem is that something has
gone wrong in the application of res judicata, joinder, lis pendens,
forum non conveniens, or antisuit injunctions. But often, especially
in international litigation, the genesis lies in the absence of control by
a higher law or by a higher court of F-2's disrespect for F-i's
judgment.
It is therefore important to get a handle on what exactly the
last-in-time rule prescribes in all these circumstances. I shall lay out
the prescriptions by surveying the rule's application across the three
subdoctrines of res judicata.
A. Claim Preclusion
For a claim preclusion example, imagine a plaintiff who won
a judgment but remains dissatisfied with the amount of damages
awarded. Instead of seeking enforcement of the judgment, she may
sue again on the original claim. The defendant relishes another try,
especially because he risks less in the second suit (greater damages)
than does the plaintiff (total loss). Although the claim merged in the
prior judgment for the claimant," neither party asserts res judicata,
and so the court holds another trial on the merits of the original
claim. The judgment reached in this second action might be for the
defendant. Hence, inconsistent judgments can come into existence.
First, if the same claim is presented in a third action, the
question will arise as to which, if either, of the now two inconsistent
judgments is to be given preclusive effect in the third action. That is,
if the originally successful plaintiff were now to bring a third action,
12. GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 567, 1144-45 (5th ed. 2011).
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17(1) (AM. LAW INST.
1982) ("[T]he claim is extinguished and merged in the judgment and a new claim
may arise on the judgment .... ).
Winter 2017] 5
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which might be either an action on the original claim or an action
upon the first judgment, could the defendant invoke the second
judgment as a defense? Yes, the second judgment is entitled to res
judicata effect under the last-in-time rule. 14
Second, if the defendant had raised the defense of res judicata
in the plaintiffs second action, but the court had refused to consider
or uphold it, the result would be the same as if the defense had not
been raised, unless the second judgment is appealed and reversed."
Third, if, instead of the defendant's winning the second
action in the example, the plaintiff had won a judgment for a greater
amount than had been awarded in the first action, maybe even by
default, the second judgment would still be the one entitled to res
judicata effect.16
B. Issue Preclusion
Now, for an issue preclusion example, in F-I a fact issue may
go in favor of A over B, the issue having been actually litigated and
determined and been essential to the judgment. If the same issue
arises in a second action in F-2 between the same parties but on a
different claim, and A fails to raise collateral estoppel or F-2 refuses
to consider or uphold it, another trial on the merits might produce an
essential determination on the issue in favor of B. For a more
concrete example, imagine a litigated determination of the value of
some land for tax purposes. Both parties think that they could do
better. So they both would decline to raise collateral estoppel in
litigation of the different claim for a subsequent tax year's liability.
Another trial on the merits might yield a different valuation.' 7 Hence,
again, inconsistent judgments can come into existence.
First, if the common issue appears in a third action in F-3
between the same parties on yet another claim, and B raises collateral
14. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 42 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1942).
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 15 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
1982) ("[T]he later of the two inconsistent judgments is ordinarily held conclusive
in a third action even when the earlier judgment was relied on in the second action
and the court erroneously held that it was not conclusive.").
. 16. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 42 cmt. b, illus. 3 (AM. LAW INST.
1942) (giving as an example a $1000 judgment in F-1 and a $600 judgment in F-2,
where the second judgment is protected by the last-in-time-rule).
17. See Donald v. J.J. White Lumber Co., 68 F.2d 441, 442 (5th Cir. 1934)
(applying the last-in-time rule).
6 [ Vol. 36:1I
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estoppel, what happens in the face of the two inconsistent
judgments? F-3 must accept the determination of F-2.18
Second, if F-3 and F-I were in fact the same court, the result
would still be that the determination of F-2 prevails. So even though
F-I acted first, and even though the proceeding in F-2 should have
been precluded, the court in F-i must ignore its own previous
determination of the issue. Indeed, the result is the same if F-2 is the
same court as F-1 or F-3 or both.1 9 Although the first judgment
normally would not be undone or otherwise overturned, it would
stand shorn henceforth of any continuing relief including preclusive
effects. 20
Third, if the third proceeding were not a third action but
merely an appeal in F-1 from the first judgment, perhaps even then
the determination of F-2 should govern the disposition of the appeal,
subordinating the earlier trial court determination in F-i to the later
determination of F-2. 2 1 Yet the appellate court in F-I would naturally
tend to resist this astounding application of the last-in-time rule.
Indeed, the better approach is for the F-i appellate court to review
the lower-court decision in the ordinary way, treating res judicata as
any other claim or defense that ordinarily had to have been presented
below and thus not bowing to F-2. 2 2 But in the future, F-2's
judgment would be the one with preclusive effects.
18. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 42 cmt. c, illus. 5-6 (AM. LAW INST.
1942) (giving specific examples in which the judgment of F-2 controls);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 15 cmt. c, illus. 3 (AM. LAW INST.
1982) (same).
19. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 42 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1942)
(stating that the rule is applicable whether the actions are brought in the same or
different states); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 114 cmt. a
(AM. LAW INST. 1971) ("The rule is applicable irrespective of whether the later
inconsistent judgment is rendered in the same State as the original judgment or in a
different State.").
20. See 2 A.C. FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 629, at
1327 (Edward W. Tuttle ed., 5th ed. 1925) (1873) (noting that the intervening
results of the first judgment should remain in place, to the extent feasible); 18
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MRLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4404, at 80-81 (2d ed. 2002) (indicating that the first
judgment stands, subject to relief from judgment or restitution).
21. See 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4404, at 77-78 (noting this
situation presents a special problem); 18A id § 4433, at 95-96 ("As in other
settings, it seems better to accept the second trial-court judgment as binding for
purposes of the last-in-time rule.").
22. See, e.g., Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 927-28 & n.3 (9th Cir.
2006) (considering also what would happen if F-i were to reverse); Canedy v.
Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 185 (7th Cir. 1994) ("But because the judgment in this
case was first, there is no res judicata issue here."); Am. Postal Workers Union
7Winter 2017]
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C. Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction
Finally, for an example that involves the subdoctrine of
jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction,23 P of F-1 might sue D of F-2
in F-1, which upon challenge finds that personal jurisdiction exists
over D. F-I gives judgment for P. Then P brings an action upon the
judgment in F-2, where D's assets are. But on collateral attack, D
asserts that the prior judgment is invalid. F-2 finds that F-I lacked
personal jurisdiction, even though the doctrine of jurisdiction to
determine jurisdiction should have foreclosed that issue. F-2 gives
judgment for D. Finally, P sues upon the first judgment in F-3. Upon
a new collateral attack, the court in F-3 faces inconsistent judgments.
First, on the issue of personal jurisdiction, F-3 must accept
the determination of F-2 as the last-in-time. 24
Second, even if in the third action P had gone back to F-1 in
order to utilize the first judgment, F-I would be obliged to respect F-
2's judgment over its own judgment.25 However, P could now sue on
his original claim, the statute of limitations permitting.26
Third, if F-i's judgment went instead by default, then F-2's
decision on personal jurisdiction would not be an inconsistent
finding, even if the cases' outcomes were inconsistent. F-2's finding
on jurisdiction would be preclusive. It is in fact the only decision on
F-i's personal jurisdiction, which decision is binding under the
ordinary rules of issue preclusion. 27 Of course, if F-2 had rejected the
collateral attack, that decision would have issue-preclusive effect.28
Columbus Area Local v. U.S. Postal Serv., 736 F.2d 317, 319 (6th Cir. 1984)
(holding that dismissal of an action in F-2 did not mandate dismissal in F-1); cf
Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 162 F.3d 724, 731 (2d Cir. 1998)
(holding that F-1 on remand must apply F-2's judgment), cert. denied, 526 U.S.
1146 (1999); 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4404, at 78-80 (treating situation
where F-2 has entered a preclusive judgment after the F-1 trial court has made
various nonfinal rulings and before any appeal has been taken).
23. See generally KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
357-63, 377-78 (4th ed. 2015).
24. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 42 cmt. b, illus. 4 (AM. LAW INST.
1942) (giving an example in which F-2's determination that F-i lacked personal
jurisdiction controls).
25. See Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 162 F.3d 724, 731 (2d
Cir. 1998) (holding that F-i must apply F-2's judgment), cert. denied, 526 U.S.
1146 (1999).
26. See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 93 (1917) (implicitly allowing
plaintiff to sue again on the claim); BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 12, at 1093.
27. See Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 162 F.3d 724, 731 (2d
Cir. 1998) (holding that F-i must apply F-2's finding of F-i's lack of jurisdiction
and so withdraw F-i's default judgment), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1146 (1999);
8 [Vol. 36: 1
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II. DISSECTING THE LAW'S RESOLUTION
A. Rationales of the Rule
Think again of that last hypothetical: default judgment in F-I
and successful collateral attack in F-2. Such a situation, where there
are technically no inconsistent findings but the judgments are
fundamentally at odds, is quite common and is commonly treated as
a variation of the problem of inconsistent judgments. It can arise not
only when F-2 passes on F-i's invalidity but also where F-2 accepts
another ground for F-i's nonrecognizability. F-2's decision on F-I's
binding effect is controlling.
Picture a New York plaintiff who wins a judgment by jury
verdict in New York. The defendant's assets in New York are few,
so the plaintiff needs to enforce the judgment elsewhere. For that
purpose, she brings an action upon the judgment in Mississippi. But
the Mississippi judge unconstitutionally refuses to recognize the New
York judgment, thus giving judgment for the defendant under the
influence of local policy. The plaintiff appeals, unsuccessfully. She
finally decides to go closer to home for enforcement, suing upon the
first judgment in New Jersey. However, the plaintiff will fail in New
Jersey.2 9 As suggested above, the best explanation for the result in
this particular situation rests not so much on any rule for inconsistent
determinations, but rather on the rule that F-2's decision on the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 114 cmt. b, illus. 2 (AM. LAW
INST. 1971) (saying that F-2's finding is preclusive in F-3). The result rests on
issue preclusion, not on claim preclusion, which should not apply to the special
cause of action upon a judgment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 110 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (treating such action's dismissal based
on nonrecognition as being not on the merits); cf RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN
KAPLAN & KEvIN M. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL
PROCEDURE 766 (12th ed. 2017) (saying merger does not apply to a judgment upon
a judgment).
For the similar treatment of the analogous problems involving arbitration
awards, see 3 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
§26.05[C][8], at 3636-38, § 27.02[D], at 3790-91 (2d ed. 2014). Because of the
specialized complications of the interplay of res judicata with arbitration practices,
this Article limits its focus to sequences of only court judgments.
28. See Arecibo Radio Corp. v. Puerto Rico, 825 F.2d 589, 592-93 (1st Cir.
1987) (holding that F-2's decision rejecting collateral attack has normal issue-
preclusive effect).
29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 482(2)(e) reporters' note 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (stating that a state's
decision not to recognize a foreign judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in
other states); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 15 cmt. c, illus. 2 (AM.
LAW INST. 1982) (noting that the judgment in F-2 is a defense in F-3).
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recognizability of F-I's judgment in any other state is binding in F-3
under the ordinary rules of issue preclusion.
The value of this illustration is to reveal that the problem of
inconsistent judgments often involves two decisions in F-2: an
implicit or express decision on whether to respect F-i's judgment
and then a treatment of the merits that differs from F-i's treatment.
For those two decisions, different rationales arise to justify F-3's
bowing to F-2's judgment as last-in-time.
1. Waiver/Preclusion on Issue of Full Faith and
Credit
The party entitled to the benefit of res judicata in the second
action was in a position to try to avoid the possibility of inconsistent
judgments. On the one hand, if the benefitee failed to avail himself of
the opportunity to invoke res judicata, and so allowed the matter to
be relitigated, he should not be entitled to complain when the second
determination is treated as conclusive in a third action. On the other
hand, if the benefitee did assert his right to preclude, but the second
court denied it, he should have sought correction of any error by
appeal from the second court, as with any other error by a trial court.
The American Law Institute's most recent restatement of the
rationale for the last-in-time rule buys into this line of waiver
thinking. It reads thus:
The considerations of policy which support the
doctrine of res judicata are not so strong as to require
that the court apply them of its own motion when the
party himself has failed to claim such benefits as may
flow from them. Accordingly, when a prior judgment
is not relied upon in a pending action in which it
would have had conclusive effect as res judicata, the
judgment in that action is valid even though it is
inconsistent with the prior judgment. It follows that it
is this later judgment, rather than the earlier, that may
be successfully urged as res judicata in a third action,
assuming that other prerequisites are satisfied. Indeed,
the later of the two inconsistent judgments is
ordinarily held conclusive in a third action even when
the earlier judgment was relied on in the second
10 [Vol. 36:1
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action and the court erroneously held that it was not
conclusive.30
Nonetheless, the ALI has thereby formulated a mighty
peculiar rationale. We are to apply the later judgment because the
party who could have benefited from it waived its benefits by failing
to urge the F-1 judgment on the F-2 court. However, the ALI's
formulation goes on to provide the same result even though that
party forwarded the F-1 judgment in the loudest terms possible. It
seems that the waiver idea might sometimes give an added
motivation to apply the last-in-time rule. But it seems not to qualify
as a rationale, because the last-in-time rule applies even when the
waiver notion is inapt.
Therefore, as the ALI shifts to the situation of the fighting
benefitee, its rationale cannot be waiver. The ALI instead embraces
the rationale of res judicata. 1 We should honor F-2's decision
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 15 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
1982).
31. Similarly, some authorities forward the rationale that F-2 has implicitly
vacated the F-1 judgment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 114 (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (applying last-in-time "if the earlier judgment is
superseded by the later judgment"); 41 A.L.I. PROC. 278-79 (1964) (Prof. Michael
Cardozo IV) (debating what would become the Second Restatement's § 114); 1
FREEMAN, supra note 20, § 102, at 181 (maintaining that in some states the later
judgment governs, "the presumption being that the first one has been vacated").
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 114 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
1971) combines the ideas of waiver and vacatur in its rationale:
The rule of this Section is based upon principles of res judicata
and of full faith and credit. It is appropriate that the losing party
should be precluded from attacking the later inconsistent
judgment if he has not sought review of this judgment both by
the appellate courts of the State of rendition and by the Supreme
Court of the United States or if the judgment has been affirmed
by these courts. So, if under these circumstances the same issue
has been differently decided in different actions between the
parties, the determination that is later in time should control if it
would have this effect under the local law of the State of
rendition. Similarly, if the court in the second action gives
consideration to the earlier judgment and decides, for some
reason or other, that this judgment does not bar the action, the
second judgment should control if it would have this effect under
the local law of the State of rendition. To be sure, the later
judgment may be erroneous and the first judgment correct. But
the parties had the opportunity to litigate the point at issue before
the second court to appeal from its judgment and ultimately to
seek review by the Supreme Court. The parties should be bound
by the later judgment so long as it remains unreversed and
Winter 2017] 11
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because it is a "thing adjudged." A decision on res judicata is itself
entitled to preclusive effect. 3 2 Indeed, given the complexity of res
judicata decisions under American law, with its carefully delineated
rules and narrowly crafted exceptions, there is especially good reason
to adopt F-2's decision. The point of res judicata is to avoid having
to reconsider the prior adjudication. So F-2's decision on res judicata
should control even when it was clearly oblivious or wrong on full
faith and credit.
Actually, there will be no inconsistent decisions on res
judicata. F-1 could not decide the res judicata effects of its own
judgment, as only a later case can decide res judicata.33 Thus, the
only decision on res judicata is F-2's. Because it is the only decision
on point, this last-in-time judgment will govern. True, the result on a
collateral attack for lack of jurisdiction might involve inconsistent
jurisdictional decisions from F-I and F-2, but the real issue for F-3 is
the res judicata effect of F-I's conclusion on jurisdiction under the
subdoctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction, and on that issue
F-2 has given the only decision.
Rethink the situation in which F-2 decided that res judicata
by F-i's judgment did not apply, because of some recognizability,
validity, finality, or bindingness defect. F-2 had a reason to do so,
and F2 often will have been right. The very idea of res judicata, even
as to an earlier decision about res judicata, is that F-3 should not get
involved in deciding whether F-2 was right or wrong. Moreover, F-3
simply has no authority to say that F-2 was wrong in deciding that
res judicata did not apply. Only a higher court with jurisdiction over
F-2 had the authority to review it.
Perhaps, then, waiver and preclusion can work in tandem as a
rationale for the last-in-time rule, each rationale applying separately
to different situations.34 First, if the benefitee of the first judgment
provided that the judgment would have this effect under the local
law of the State of its rendition. If the State where the later
inconsistent judgment is rendered applies the ordinary rules of
res judicata, this State will hold that the later judgment
supersedes the earlier judgment to the extent that the judgments
are inconsistent.
32. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4404, at 65 & n.29.
33. See FIELD ET AL., supra note 27, at 293, 767-68 (explaining that only in a
second action can res judicata be raised and decided).
34. Such a tandem motivation is known to the law: (a) if the defendant fails to
raise personal jurisdiction correctly, the jurisdictional point is waived; but (b) if the
defendant raises personal jurisdiction unsuccessfully, the point is precluded by the
res judicata subdoctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction. CLERMONT, supra
note 23, at 359-60, 363.
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fails to invoke it in F-2, then waiver makes the second judgment
binding. Second, if the benefitee does assert it, but the F-2 court
rejects its bindingness, then F-2's decision on res judicata is binding
and, consequently, so should its merits decisions be binding.
Together, waiver and preclusion really drive the U.S. acceptance of
last-in-time.
2. Simplicity of Looking to F-2 on Issue of
Respect for F-1
Other arguments for the last-in-time rule, although hardly
overwhelming and far less important than waiver/preclusion, do
exist. The initial supporting argument is that looking at the later
judgment involves less judicial effort.35
If F-3 were to take it upon itself to verify whether F-i's
judgment should have been preclusive in F-2, it would have to
reexamine that judgment's recognizability, validity, finality, and
bindingness, which F-2's judgment may have already indicated are
questionable, and probably also examine whether the winner in F-i
had waived the victory by not pushing it sufficiently in F-2.
Alternatively, if F-3 were just to switch to a first-in-time rule, it
would still have to reexamine the recognizability, validity, finality,
and bindingness of F-i's judgment. By virtue of waiver/preclusion,
F-3 can duck these questions and just look to F-2's judgment.
Admittedly, F-2's recognizability, validity, finality, or
bindingness might be challengeable too. But in the situation of
inconsistent judgments, the status of F-i's judgment is necessarily
questionable. The status of F-2's judgment might be straightforward.
Thus, it should on average slightly reduce the litigatory load to look
to the often less challengeable judgment of F-2 rather than look to F-
I's questionable judgment.36
3. Reliability of F-2 on the Merits
Another line of argument is that the later judgment is perhaps
more apt to be well-contested, well-informed, and correct on the
35. See William L. Reynolds, The Iron Law ofFull Faith and Credit, 53 MD.
L. REv. 412, 416 (1994) (noting that the F-3 court is spared the task of comparing
the judgments of F-I and F-2 and deciding which is correct).
36. See also infra note 214 and accompanying text (suggesting another way
that first-in-time is actually the more complicated rule).
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merits, as it usually resulted from relitigation and redetermination.37
Additionally, if we abandon formalism for realism, F-2 may very
well have manipulated its full faith and credit decision because it felt
that F-1 was wrong on the merits. Although res judicata does not
customarily look to whether the prior judgment was correct, the
lawmaker when formulating a rule of res judicata need not ignore
which decisions will on average tend to have been correct.3 8
Counterarguments to this reliability rationale do exist. First,
in the most troubling cases, F-3 will have good reason to think that
F-2 was wrong, especially on the res judicata effect of F-i's
judgment. Any comfort drawn from the supposed wisdom of F-2's
judgment is then likely scant. Second, the rest of the world, as we
shall see, 39 follows the rule that the first-in-time judgment prevails.
Therefore, it is at best a weak reason to favor the last-in-time
judgment that it is slightly more reliable.
Other arguments, along the lines that F-2 somehow gave the
more legitimate prior decision, vaporize on closer inspection. One
such argument stresses that America's early last-in-time precedents
arose in a federal nation nurturing full faith and credit, which aimed
at converting the American sovereigns from a grouping of
"independent foreign sovereignties" into "integral parts of a single
nation."40 The argument runs that this full faith and credit principle
naturally implies looking at the nation's latest word without
inquiring into whether it was erroneous. However, one could almost
as easily argue that full faith and credit implies looking at the first
word, given its having subsequently been disrespected. Moreover,
elsewhere in the world, federalism has not led to a last-in-time rule. 4 1
37. See 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4423, at 619. One might think
that the better-known last-in-time rule for treaties lends some tangential support. It
extends the principle of leges posteriors priores contrarias abrogant (later laws
abrogate prior contrary laws). But the principle rests on textual, structural,
historical, and functional grounds different from the grounds for full faith and
credit. See generally Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time
Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319 (2005).
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST.
1982) ("Giving a prior determination of an issue conclusive effect in subsequent
litigation is justified not merely as avoiding further costs of litigation but also by
underlying confidence that the result reached is substantially correct.").
39. See infra Part II-C.
40. V.L. v E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1020 (2016) (quoting Milwaukee Cty. v.
M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935)).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 137 (Canada) & 148 (Germany).
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4. Finality on the Merits
One last rationale is quite different from waiver/preclusion,
simplicity, and reliability. In order to avoid relitigation, one of the
inconsistent judgments, be it the first-in-time or the last-in-time,
must prevail. In other words, the goal of finality calls for having
some rule in place, even an arbitrary one.
However, this finality argument is not too strong. Supporters
of the rule may raise the specter of theoretically endless relitigation,
but in fact that risk does not exist. The approach could be that neither
F-I's nor F-2's judgment is binding and that F-3's fresh decision will
act as the henceforth-preclusive tiebreaker. Alternatively, the system
could provide, with nonfatal consequences to itself, that inconsistent
results mean no preclusion ever'on the point. Yet current law usually
eschews both of these approaches, 4 2 except that inconsistent findings
may prevent any future invocation of nonmutual collateral
estoppel.4 3
In sum, the last-in-time rule exists because we would like one
of the inconsistent judgments to be final, and it might as well be the
later judgment both on the logic of waiver/preclusion and also in the
interests of simplicity and reliability.44 The rule is close to being an
42. But see Shaw v. Broadbent, 29 N.E. 238, 241 (N.Y. 1891) (holding that
"one estoppel neutralizes the other, and the. question is left to be tried over"); cf
Bata v. Bata, 163 A.2d 493, 506 (Del. 1960) (dictum) ("It has been suggested that
in the face of two conflicting foreign determinations, involving a common question
but different causes of action, the court of the forum should disregard both and
should proceed at once to the merits."). No case has ever followed the Shaw
holding, and several have expressly rejected it. E.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Chi.
Theological Seminary v. People ex rel. Raymond, 59 N.E. 977, 980 (Ill. 1901).
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(4) cmt. f (AM. LAW
INST. 1982) (listing as a discretionary factor against nonmutual preclusion that the
"determination relied on as preclusive is itself inconsistent with some other
adjudication of the same issue"). Nonmutual collateral estoppel differs from the
problem of inconsistent judgments in that only one of the prior judgments is
potentially preclusive in F-3. The inconsistency of determinations is then just an
argument, applicable only in the context of nonmutuality, against giving that
judgment its normal preclusive effect.
For another example of nonpreclusion as the solution, the Second Restatement
provides that where a judgment rests on alternative findings, neither is binding. Id.
§ 27 cmts. i, o; see FIELD ET AL., supra note 27, at 822-24 (criticizing the Second
Restatement's approach).
44. For such a listing of reasons, see Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318,
322-23 (9th Cir. 1988) (other citations omitted):
When two inconsistent judgments exist, it is tempting for a
court to reexamine the merits of the litigants' dispute and choose
the result it likes best. There are important reasons to avoid this
15Winter 2017]
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arbitrary rule for the sake of having a rule, but it is not a particularly
bad rule.
B. Development of the Rule
1. Emergence
The last-in-time rule merely happened. For the kinds of cases
American courts were encountering, the foregoing rationales made
last-in-time seem the natural solution. The rule's development adds
to the sense of its arbitrariness.
Early on, the problem arose rarely, in state4 and federal 46
cases. In the primitive problem's sequence of three actions, all three
temptation. First, if one party could have raised res judicata, but
did not, that litigant must bear the cost of its tactic or
inadvertence. Second, the most recent court to decide the matter
may have considered and rejected the operation of the prior
judgment as res judicata, and its decision should be treated as
res judicata on the preclusive effect of the prior judgment.
Finally, the last in time rule is supported by the rationale that it
"'end[s] the chain of relitigation ... by stopping it where it
[stands]' after entry of the [most recent] court's judgment, and
thereby discourages relitigation in [yet another] court." Id.
(quoting Porter v. Wilson, 419 F.2d 254, 259 (9th Cir.1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1020, 90 S. Ct. 1260, 25 L. Ed.2d 531
(1970)). Therefore, even when we think that the most recent
judgment might be wrong, we still give it res judicata effect, so
that finality is achieved and the parties are encouraged to appeal
an inconsistent judgment directly rather than attack it collaterally
before another court.
45. See, e.g., In re McNeil's Estate, 100 P. 1086, 1090 (Cal. 1909) (involving
a sequence of Pennsylvania, California, and California actions, where the winner in
F-1 failed to raise the F-i judgment in F-2); Tyrrell v. Baldwin, 6 P. 867, 869 (Cal.
1885) ("These judgments were rendered in actions between the same parties, in
respect to the same subject-matter, and the rule in such cases is that the last
judgment concludes."); Bank of Montreal v. Griffin's Estate, 190 Ill. App. 221,
226 (1914) (involving a sequence of three Illinois actions, where the winner in F-i
failed to raise the F-I judgment in F-2: "[T]he judgment last in point of time is the
judgment to which effect must be given .... ); Cooley v. Brayton, 16 Iowa 10, 19
(1864) (involving a sequence of three Iowa actions, where the winner in F-1 failed
to raise the F-1 judgment in F-2: "He failed to do so, and he is, beyond all
question, bound and concluded by the latter decree .... ); Bateman v. Grand
Rapids & I.R. Co., 56 N.W. 28, 29 (Mich. 1893) (involving a sequence of three
Michigan actions, where the winner in F-1 failed to raise the F-1 judgment in F-2:
"Plaintiff had an opportunity, in the replevin case, to plead the former judgment,
but neglected to do so, and must be held to have waived the estoppel."); Marsh v.
Mandeville, 28 Miss. 122, 128 (1854) (involving a sequence of federal,
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would likely come in the same jurisdiction,4 7 although occasionally
the actions would be interjurisdictional but still all American.48
Mostly the cases involved the situation in which the benefitee of the
F-i judgment failed to raise it in F-2, so that the waiver notion by
itself made the last-in-time judgment the natural choice.4 9
Eventually, as res judicata doctrine expanded in scope and the case
law accumulated, some of the cases involved the court in F-2
actually rejecting F-i's judgment."o Still, the policy choice
underlying the rule received little discussion in the courts.
A few of these cases emerged from the mists of history to
obtain some prominence as standard cites.5 1 Even cases not really
involving inconsistent judgments came to recite the last-in-time rule
as established law. 5 2 Last-in-time thereby became the accepted
Mississippi, and Mississippi actions, where the winner in F-I failed to raise the F-I
judgment in F-2).
46. See, e.g., Donald v. J.J. White Lumber Co., 68 F.2d 441, 442 (5th Cir.
1934) (involving a sequence of three federal actions, where the winner in F-1
failed to raise the F-i judgment in F-2: "But the government, for reasons of its
own, chose not to rely on it in that suit, and in our opinion thereby waived it, and
cannot assert it in this case. Where there are two conflicting judgments, the last in
point of time is the one which controls.").
47. See, e.g., Bank of Montreal v. Griffin's Estate, 190 Ill. App. 221 (1914)
(involving cases all from the same state); Cooley v. Brayton, 16 Iowa 10 (1864)
(same); Bateman v. Grand Rapids & I.R. Co., 56 N.W. 28 (Mich. 1893) (same).
48. See, e.g., In re McNeil's Estate, 100 P. 1086, 1090 (Cal. 1909) (involving
a sequence of Pennsylvania, California, and California actions); Marsh v.
Mandeville, 28 Miss. 122, 128 (1854) (involving a sequence of federal,
Mississippi, and Mississippi actions).
49. E.g., Donald v. J.J. White Lumber Co., 68 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1934); In re
McNeil's Estate, 100 P. 1086, 1090 (Cal. 1909); Bank of Montreal v. Griffin's
Estate, 190 Ill. App. 221 (1914); Cooley v. Brayton, 16 Iowa 10 (1864); Bateman
v. Grand Rapids & I.R. Co., 56 N.W. 28 (Mich. 1893); Marsh v. Mandeville, 28
Miss. 122, 128 (1854).
50. See, e.g., Southard v. Southard, 305 F.2d 730, 732 (2d Cir. 1962) ("The
substantive defense that the Connecticut divorce was barred by the requirement
that that state give full faith and credit to the Nevada decree was one that could
have been and indeed apparently was raised in the Connecticut court. Whether that
court actually passed upon the defense or not, principles of res judicata forbid us
to consider it. The appellant's opportunity to attack the Connecticut decree on the
merits died with his failure to appeal .... ).
51. E.g., Tyrrell v. Baldwin, 6 P. 867, 869 (Cal. 1885); Cooley v. Brayton, 16
Iowa 10 (1864).
52. See, e.g., Galvin v. Palmer, 66 P. 572, 573 (Cal. 1901) ("If two judgments
have been entered in a cause, and the record-the judgment roll-is silent in
reference to the reason therefor, the later in point of time must be deemed the true
and final judgment in the case."); Cummins v. Mullins, 210 S.W. 170, 172 (Ky.
1919) ("Where there are two conflicting judgments rendered by the same court
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answer, and orthodox enough to appear in early treatises. The leading
treatise on judgments stated the last-in-time rule from its first edition
of 187353 until its fifth and last edition of 1925.54 In between another
treatise stated the rule nicely:
The last judgment rendered in regard-to a matter is res
judicata." The former judgment must be used to
prevent it.. .. But if he does not bring that fact to the
attention of the court, or if he does do so, and it is
disregarded, in either case the former judgment, the
same as all other defenses, is concluded.56
Other treatises reaching this topic followed suit, similarly without
real explanation or justification.5 7 Certainly, neither treatises nor
cases made reference to any of the little-known foreign approaches,
such as the developing first-in-time rule in England.
In 1886, the U.S. Supreme Court waded in. The little-cited
Dimock v. Revere Copper Co. 59 involved three actions, as usual. First
came Dimock's federal discharge in bankruptcy. Next came a
Massachusetts judgment in an action by Revere against Dimock. on
promissory notes, in which Dimock failed. to bring the discharge to
the attention of the Massachusetts court and so suffered a loss.
Lastly, Revere sued upon its judgment in New York. When Dimock
then invoked the discharge, New York instead accepted the last-in-
time judgment. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed:
upon the same rights of the same parties, growing out of the same contract, that
which is later in time will prevail.").
53. A.C. FREEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 332, at 294
(S.F., A.L. Bancroft & Co. 1873) ("Last Judgment Prevails").
54. 2 FREEMAN, supra note 20, § 629, at 1326 ("[T]he last judgment controls
and determines the rights of the parties.").
55. The cases cited in support were Cooley v. Brayton, 16 Iowa 10 (1864),
and Bateman v. Grand Rapids & I.R. Co., 56 N.W. 28 (Mich. 1893).
56., 1 JOHN M. VAN FLEET, RES JUDICATA: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
FORMER ADJUDICATION § 9, at 91-92 (Indianapolis, Bowen-Merrill Co. 1895)
(citing no cases for his assertion regarding nonwaiver situations).
57. J.C. WELLS, A TREATISE ON THE DOCTRINES OF RES ADJUDICATA AND
STARE DECISIS § 339, at 278 (Des Moines, Mills & Co. 1878) ("[H]e cannot
afterward attack the last decree."); see HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS, INCLUDING THE LAW OF RES JUDICATA (2d ed. 1902)
(1891) (making no mention of the point).
58. See infra text accompanying note 130.
59. 117 U.S. 559 (1886).
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We are of opinion that, having in his hands a
good defence at the time judgment was rendered
against him [in F-2], namely, the order of discharge
[in F-1], and having failed to present it to a court
which had jurisdiction of his case, and of all the
defences which he might have made, including this,
the judgment is a valid judgment, and that the defence
cannot be set up here in an action on that judgment [in
F-3].60
In 1939, the Supreme Court took a giant step further in its
leading case on this problem. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.
involved a fight over mining company stock between stepdaughter
and stepfather.6 1 First, a Washington probate court, after making a
litigated determination that it had subject-matter jurisdiction, held for
the stepfather.6 2 Second, he relied on that judgment in an Idaho
proceeding, but the Idaho court found that the Washington court had
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. 63 The stepfather unsuccessfully
appealed the full faith and credit question to the Idaho Supreme
Court and then unsuccessfully petitioned for certiorari.64 On remand,
the trial court determined ownership in the stepdaughter, and the
stepfather took no further appeal from that final judgment. 65 Third,
Washington's subject-matter jurisdiction and the parties' ownership
questions reappeared in an interpleader suit in the District of Idaho,
which applied the last-in-time rule in favor of the stepdaughter. 66 The
U.S. Supreme Court affirmed: "Even where the decision against
validity of the original judgment is erroneous, it is a valid exercise of
judicial power by the second court. One trial of an issue is enough."67
Any waiver argument based on a failure to assert res judicata
in F-2 was unavailable on the facts of Treinies. Consequently, its
holding represents a significant expansion of the last-in-time rule to
nonwaiver situations. However, the Court did not explain or justify
60. Id. at 566. Subsequently, the Supreme Court applied the last-in-time rule
without formulating, explaining, or justifying it, once citing Dimock, Boynton v.
Ball, 121 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1887), but usually not citing Dimock, e.g., Davis v.
Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 39-40 (1938) (semble); Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 199
(1932).
61. 308 U.S. 66, 69 (1939).
62. Id. at 69-70.
63. Id. at 74-76.
64. Id. at 74-75.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 75-76.
67. Id. at 78.
19Winter 2017]
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
itself. None of the courts or the parties involved in the case expressly
mentioned "last-in-time," and none cited Dimock. Their debate was
over whether F-3 should reconsider the duty of F-2 to give full faith
and credit to F-I's judgment 68 or whether full faith and credit to F-
2's judgment meant ignoring possible errors in that judgment. 6 9 The
Court simply barreled down the latter route by assuming that the
latest judgment controlled.7 0
With Treinies recently entered on the books, the American
Law Institute was compelled to address the matter for the first time.
Its involvement would prove crucial because of the Supreme Court's
failure to formulate the doctrine explicitly. In fact, through a series of
four different projects over the years, the ALI has played an outsized
role in the development of the doctrine.
In 1942, the Restatement of Judgments codified and extended
the Treinies result, by sweepingly providing a last-in-time rule for all
of res judicata, whether or not a waiver argument was available. Its
blackletter stated: "Where in two successive actions between the
same parties inconsistent judgments are rendered, the judgment in
the second action is controlling in a third action between the
parties." 7 1 The Restatement stated the rule not only as a matter of
domestic res judicata law but also as the law governing interstate
situations.7 2 The appended comments gave no rationale, and the
Restatement contained no reporter's notes. The section appeared in
essentially identical form in the initial drafts 73 and seems to have
received no group attention or discussion at the annual meetings.7 4
The broad rule apparently was accepted as well-settled.
68. Petitioner's Reply to Brief of Respondents Katherine Mason et al. at 13,
23-24, Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939) (No. 4).
69. Brief of Respondent, Sunshine Mining Company at 28-34, 39-43,
Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939) (No. 4).
70. Subsequently, Supreme Court cases just applied the last-in-time rule,
citing Treinies without formulating, explaining, or justifying the rule. E.g., Sutton
v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 408 & n.7 (1952); Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 552
(1947) (also emphasizing the benefitee's failure to have raised the F-i judgment in
F-2, an argument available on that case's facts).
71. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 42 (AM. LAW INST. 1942).
72. Id. cmt. e.
73. Id. § 305 (AM. LAW INST. Council Draft No. 1, Jan. 6, 1941) (setting forth
a draft that differed from the final § 42 only in lacking what is now illustration 4
and having comments c and d in reverse order); id. (AM. LAW INST. Tentative
Draft No. 1, Mar. 19, 1941) (setting forth the same draft except that it now
included illustration 4).
74. See 19 A.L.I. PROC. 282 (July 1, 1941-June 30, 1942) (mentioning the
idea only in connection with a different section, with Professor Austin W. Scott as
the Reporter responsible for § 42 observing: "It is the last thing that happens that
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2. Challenge
By far the premier citation on this subject is the 1969
Harvard Law Review article by then-Professor Ruth Bader
Ginsburg.7" It was a simply constructed article. She focused on the
internal American approach, putting international litigation to the
side.76 The article proceeded in just two parts.
The first part recited in detail the four leading Supreme Court
precedents at that time.7 7 She showed how those cases enshrined the
last-in-time rule. 78 It applied not only where the benefited party
waived the F-1 judgment by failing to assert it, but also where the
party strongly resisted F-2's denial of full faith and credit. 7 9 It
applied even where F-I and F-3 were the same courts.80
The second part discussed three state cases that had flouted
their seeming duty to apply the last-in-time rule, tending in particular
to do so when F-i and F-3 were the same courts.81 These cases met
counts. That is true where the judgments are inconsistent with each other, and it
is the last one which makes it binding on the parties even though it is not in the
first action."); 18 A.L.I. PROC. 382-432 (July 1, 1940-June 30, 1941) (making no
reference to the section at all).
75. Ruth B. Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The
Last-in-Time Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82 HARV. L. REv. 798 (1969).
76. Id. at 804-05.
77. Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952) (involving a sequence of Illinois,
New York, and Southern District of Illinois marital actions, where F-2 invalidated
the F-1 judgment of divorce); Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947) (involving a
sequence of Illinois, Missouri, and Illinois liquidation actions, where the benefitee
of the F-1 judgment failed to raise it in F-2); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308
U.S. 66 (1939) (involving a sequence of Washington, Idaho, and District of Idaho
ownership actions, where F-2 erroneously invalidated the F-1 judgment for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction); Dimock v. Revere Copper Co., 117 U.S. 559 (1886)
(involving a sequence of District of Massachusetts, Massachusetts, and New York
debt actions, where the benefitee of the F-i judgment failed to raise it in F-2).
78. Ginsburg, supra note 75, at 800-11.
79. See Treinies, 308 U.S. at 77 (relating that the benefitee ofF-1 even sought
certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court on F-2's denial of full faith and credit,
although that was on an interim appeal rather than on review of the final decree).
80. See Morris, 329 U.S. at 551 ("That determination is final and conclusive
in all courts.").
81. See Ginsburg, supra note 75, 811-19 (discussing Porter v. Porter, 416
P.2d 564 (Ariz. 1966) (involving a sequence of Arizona, Idaho, and Arizona land
actions, where the benefitee of the F-1 judgment failed to raise it in F-2); Kessler v.
Fauquier Nat'1 Bank, 81 S.E.2d 440 (Va. 1954) (involving a sequence of Virginia,
Florida, and Virginia marital actions, where F-2 rejected the F-1 judgment
upholding divorce); Perry v. Perry, 318 P.2d 968 (Wash. 1957) (involving a
sequence of Washington, Massachusetts, and Washington marital actions, where
the benefitee of the F-i judgment failed to raise it in F-2)).
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with the professor's clear disapproval 82 and prompted her to call on
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and put down the rebellion.
A point made almost in passing in the article attracted the
most attention and still receives regular citation. It was her suggested
limitation on F-3's full faith and credit obligation to honor the last-
in-time:
But the Court has not yet considered the ultimate
question: where credit for the first state's judgment is
demanded but denied in the second state and the
diligent pursuit of the appellate route concludes with a
denial of certiorari, does the lastin-time rule still
apply? Justification for the rule depends on both the
full faith and credit obligation of the second state, and
the availability of an impartial tribunal to correct the
second state's error, should it fail to give the first
judgment the respect constitutionally due it. When the
impartial arbiter refuses to act, however, the second
82. See also id. at 819-30 (disapproving three cases where the sequence was
F-1, F-2, and F-1, and the last court followed the initial F-i judgment even though
it had not been entitled to full faith and credit, say, because it was nonfinal: Kubon
v. Kubon, 331 P.2d 636 (Cal. 1958); Colby v. Colby, 369 P.2d 1019 (Nev. 1962);
Joffe v. Joffe, 384 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1967)); cf 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20,
§ 4404, at 78-80 (treating situation in F-i where F-2 has entered a preclusive
judgment after the F- 1 trial court has made various nonfinal rulings and before any
appeal has been taken).
83. Ginsburg, supra note 75, at 811-19. Despite her plea, the rebellion still
simmers. See, e.g., Medveskas v. Karparis, 640 A.2d 543 (Vt. 1994) (involving a
sequence of Vermont, Massachusetts, and Vermont support actions, where the
benefitee of the F-1 judgment had raised it unsuccessfully in F-2). But see, e.g.,
Thoma v. Thoma, 934 P.2d 1066, 1070-71 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) ("Cases like
Medveskas exemplify the parochial attitude that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
was intended to override."). Denial of certiorari without dissent in cases presenting
the problem during her time on the Court include Stauber v. McGrath, 555 U.S.
969 (2008) (involving a sequence of Ohio, California, and Ohio paternity actions,
where the benefitee of the F-1 judgment had raised it unsuccessfully in F-2; Ohio
disregarded the California judgment, and both sides cited her article to the U.S.
Supreme Court); Bruetman v. Herbstein, 537 U.S. 878 (2002) (involving a
sequence of Southern District of New York, Argentina, and Northern District of
Illinois actions, where F-3 disregarded the foreign-nation's nonfinal judgment);
Rash v. Rash, 528 U.S. 1077 (2000) (applying below the last-in-time rule to a
sequence of Florida, New Jersey, and Middle District of Florida marital actions,
where the benefitee of the F-1 judgment had raised it unsuccessfully in F-2); and
Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 526 U.S. 1146 (1999) (holding
below that F-i must apply F-2's finding of F-i's lack of jurisdiction and so
withdraw F-l 's default judgment). The Supreme Court has cited her article only
once, in Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 236 n.9 (1998) (Ginsburg, J.).
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state's rejection of the first state's judgment should
not automatically become the national solution to the
matter in controversy. Rather, the court subsequently
confronted with the conflicting judgments should, in
effect, provide the check unsuccessfully sought from
the Supreme Court.84
In her view, if the second action is brought in a different state from
the state of the first judgment's rendition; the court in the second
action refuses to accord preclusive effect to the first judgment; the
appellate courts of the second state affirm; the U.S. Supreme Court
denies certiorari; the matter arises in a third action; and the third
court finds the second court's full faith and credit decision to be in
contravention of the Full Faith and Credit Clause8 5 and Act, 86 then
the third court should give full faith and credit to the first court's
judgment.
3. Retrenchment
The second version of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws in
1971 added a section to treat inconsistent judgments. Expressly
relying on the Restatement of Judgments' provision, it stated an
elaborated blackletter rule:
A judgment rendered in a State of the United States
will not be recognized or enforced in sister States if an
inconsistent, but valid, judgment is subsequently
rendered in another action between the parties and if
the earlier judgment is superseded by the later
judgment under the local law of the State where the
later judgment was rendered.
84. Ginsburg, supra note 75, at 831-32; see id at 803-04 ("Hence, such a
denial of certiorari seems hardly an appropriate basis for endowing F-2 with
ultimate authority to displace F-i's adjudication with its own."), 805-06
("However, when the national tribunal fails to act, despite a properly timed and
formally correct invitation for review, some of the distinctions between interstate
and international judgments, significant at earlier stages, lose force.... Rather, the
recognition forum should attempt to function as surrogate arbiter and view the case
from the perspective the Supreme Court would have taken had it granted review.").
85. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012).
87. See generally Ginsburg, supra note 75.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 114 (AM. LAW INST.
1971).
23Winter 2017]
THE RE VIE WOF LITIGATION
Significantly, its final comment qualified the scope of the rule: "It is
uncertain whether the rule of this Section will be applied to
judgments rendered in a foreign nation." 89 Moreover, its initial
comment ungrammatically and ambiguously added this qualification:
"The rule of this Section is applicable if the later inconsistent
judgment is valid (see § 92) and, provided at least, that the Supreme
Court of the United States has not refused to review this judgment." 90
This was a last-minute bow to Professor Ginsburg, whose recently
published article received a "see generally" citation in the reporter's
note, the only citation to commentary in the note.91 Unlike the
Restatement of Judgments' provision on inconsistent judgments, this
section in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws received hot
debate at the annual meeting when first proposed in rather sweeping
terms. 9 2 The provision was attacked on the ground that "it
encourages relitigation" and "jurisdiction hunting." 93 On a deeper
level, the concerns were over whether the section should extend to
foreign-nation judgments 9 4 and whether it should extend to domestic
judgments denying full faith and credit. 9 5 The section accordingly
evolved over time to acquire its foreign-nation qualification and,
eventually, the Ginsburg qualification. 9 6
89. Id. cmt. d.
90. Id. cmt. a. A paragraph added to the end of comment b helped to clarify:
The rule may be different in a situation where the losing
party has been denied review of the later inconsistent judgment
by the Supreme Court of the United States. In such a situation, it
might be thought inappropriate to require that conclusive effect
be given under full faith and credit to the later inconsistent
judgment.
91. Id. reporter's note.
92. See 41 A.L.I. PROC. 275-81 (1964) (defeating a motion to strike the
section).
93. Id. at 276.
94. See id. at 277 (Prof. Rudolf B. Schlesinger); see also id. (indicating that
the Reporter, Professor Willis L.M. Reese, agreed to qualify the section by adding
comment d); supra text accompanying note 11.
95. See 41 A.L.I. PROC. 276-79 (Messrs. Sigmund Timberg & Robert M.
Benjamin). The suggestion seemed to be that the section should apply only to a
party who failed to raise full faith and credit in F-2 and pursue it all the way to the
U.S. Supreme Court.
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 439a (AM. LAW
INST. Tentative Draft No. 10, 1964) (setting forth the original draft, which would
be applicable to recognizable foreign-nation judgments and which did not contain
the Ginsburg qualification); id. (AM. LAW INST. Preliminary Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 1966) (adding the qualification for foreign-nation judgments as comment d);
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The American Law Institute revisited the problem of
inconsistent judgments in 1982's Restatement (Second) of
Judgments. Its blackletter read: "When in two actions inconsistent
final judgments are rendered, it is the later, not the earlier, judgment
that is accorded conclusive effect in a third action under the rules of
res judicata." 9 7 First, as the Judgments project treats only an internal
law of res judicata, it does not touch foreign-nation judgments.
Second, the drafting effort initially embraced and then abandoned the
Ginsburg qualification. 9 8 The initial reporters, Professors Benjamin
Kaplan and David L. Shapiro, posed her hypothetical of denied
certiorari as the central question to be faced in drafting the relevant
section.99 In the preliminary draft submitted to the project's Advisers
for discussion in October 1972, they followed the earlier Restatement
of Judgments and the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, but
added a comment that would allow F-3 to reconsider F-2's full faith
and credit decision at the behest of a party denied certiorari."oo
Almost immediately, however, they retreated to a mere cross-
reference to the reservation of the point in the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws. 101 That approach carried forward, 10 2 producing
no discussion at the annual meeting.1 0 3 Essentially, the American
Law Institute punted on Ginsburg.
id. § 114 (AM. LAW INST. Proposed Final Draft Pt. 1, 1967) (editing out a reference
to foreign-nation judgments in comment a).
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 15 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
98. See id. at 38 n.13 (AM. LAW INST. Preliminary Survey, Nov. 26, 1969)
(explaining that the Second Restatement would reach interstate situations because
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 42 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1942) reached them).
99. Id. at 36-38.
100. Id. § 41.2 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. Preliminary Draft No. 2, Aug. 30,
1972) (citing the Ginsburg article):
However, the constitutional compulsion should not apply if,
when the earlier judgment was refused effect in the second
action, the party injured contended that the refusal was a denial
of full faith and credit, and attempted to carry this contention to
the Supreme Court of the United States, but that Court refused
review. In those circumstances a court asked to give effect to the
later judgment is entitled to consider independently on the merits
whether the earlier judgment should have been given conclusive
effect under the full faith and credit clause, and if it decides that
question in the affirmative, to give conclusive effect to the earlier
rather than the later judgment.
101. Id. (AM. LAW INST. Council Draft No. 1, Dec. 21, 1972).
102. Id. (AM. LAW INST. Tentative Draft No. 1, Mar. 28, 1973).
103. See 50 A.L.I. PROC. 288 (1973) (giving brief description of the section
by Justice Kaplan, who observed: "There the rule of the road, which is also, I think
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The U.S. Supreme Court has since returned to the problem of
inconsistent judgments, and its capstone message explained that, for
American judgments, American law embodies the last-in-time rule
seemingly unadorned by exceptions. In the Parsons Steel case,1 04 the
sequence began with plaintiffs suing a bank for fraud in an Alabama
court. A couple of months later, they sued the bank for the same acts
under a federal banking statute in the federal court for the Middle
District of Alabama. The federal action went to judgment first (F-1),
with a decision for the bank. The bank then asserted claim and issue
preclusion in the state action, but the state court ruled against res
judicata without giving reasons and awarded the plaintiffs
$4,000,001 in damages (F-2), against which the bank filed post-trial
motions. The bank immediately returned to the same federal district
court, which decided that its prior judgment was claim-preclusive
and so issued an injunction against enforcement by the state-court
plaintiffs (F-3). The court of appeals affirmed in relevant part. The
Supreme Court unanimously reversed the federal-court injunction:
Once the state court has finally rejected a claim of res
judicata, then the Full Faith and Credit Act becomes
applicable and federal courts must turn to state law to
determine the preclusive effect of the state court's
decision.
... [T]he Full Faith and Credit Act requires that
federal courts give the state-court judgment,. and
particularly the state court's resolution of the res
judicata issue, the same preclusive effect it would
have had in another court of the same State.
Challenges to the correctness of a state court's
determination as to the conclusive effect of a federal
judgment must be pursued by way of appeal through
the state-court system and certiorari from this
Court. 105
supported in reason, is that it is the later of the two which is controlling in the third
action.").
104. Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518 (1986) (Rehnquist,
J.).
105. Id. at 524-25. On remand the district court concluded that the Alabama
decision was not preclusive because it was still nonfinal and so the court again
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Maybe the ALI should have faced its reserved questions.
Maybe the Supreme Court should have spoken more precisely, to
avoid being seen as sidestepping those questions. If modem law had
the gumption to answer, is the Ginsburg exception sound? No.
Although she had no case support for her exception, hers was
a plausible proposal. It was arguable that the party claiming the
benefit of the first judgment should not be bound by the preclusive
effect of the second judgment if the Supreme Court denies certiorari.
After all, the party could have done nothing more to avoid an
inconsistent judgment, and the nation's neutral arbiter had failed to
act. Moreover, her hypothetical has emotional force. It tempts
because it involves a. past error on preclusion when we are trying to
decide about preclusion and because it inspires a distaste for
respecting the disrespecting F-2. At the very least, her scenario
works well to expose, on peculiarly wrenching facts, the somewhat
arbitrarily cruel nature of the last-in-time rule.
Her solution was to cast preclusion aside as a rationale for the
last-in-time rule. She in essence embraced waiver as the exclusive
rationale. She would apply the last-in-time rule only when waiver,
however attenuated, bolstered the second state's judgment. To
accommodate the case law, she had to extend waiver to the extreme
of requiring the benefitee to pursue the res judicata point as far as
possible in F-2, going after the very final judgment all the way to
certiorari whether or not it would be rational to do so. Then if the
Supreme Court denied audience to the benefitee, the last-in-time rule
would cease to apply.
Waiver makes the most sense, however, if what it means is
failure to assert res judicata in F-2 at all. Prior cases had utilized
preclusion as a partial rationale for stretching the last-in-time rule to
situations where the benefitee had in fact asserted res judicata in F-2.
A preclusion rationale would honor a final decision of F-2 on res
judicata, while her approach would not if the loser banged
unsuccessfully on the doors of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Her approach collides with the rest of res judicata doctrine.
Res judicata frequently enshrines erroneous judgments, including
those to which the Supreme Court has denied certiorari. It needs to
do this to accomplish its aims. Errors in applying res judicata are no
different from any kind of error. They certainly are no more serious
than errors as to due process, equal protection, or the jury right, all
being errors as to which res judicata routinely makes courts turn a
enjoined its enforcement, and the court of appeals affirmed. First Ala. Bank of
Montgomery, N.A. v. Parsons Steel, Inc., 825 F.2d 1475 (11th Cir. 1987).
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blind eye despite the denial of certiorari. Her giving the relentless,
but unsuccessful, res judicata disputant a break clashes with the
treatment of all other litigants.106
To be consistent with the rest of res judicata, we should
protect the second judgment here by the usual last-in-time rule.
Additionally, the other rationales for the last-in-time rule carry over.
They push toward application of the usual rule even in her extreme
scenario. One judgment should prevail as final, without reexamining
the merits of the prior judgments. Also, it is more reliable and
simpler to accept the last judgment. Yet Professor Ginsburg would
have F-3 second-guess F-2's preclusion decision when certiorari had
been denied.
The later case law, such as it is, is against her. In Porter v.
Wilson, the Ninth Circuit had to consider four lawsuits.' 0 7 Arizona
had issued the first judgment on ownership of a hotel. Idaho decided
that Arizona's judgment was not binding for lack of personal
jurisdiction and so rendered an inconsistent judgment.'o Arizona
then decided that the Idaho judgment did not deserve full faith and
credit and so stuck to its view of the dispute, a decision on which the
U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.1 09 The District of Arizona, in a
new diversity action, decided that the last judgment was binding,
whether it was right or wrong, and the court of appeals affirmed:
"Defendants' basic error, it seems to us, lies in the mistaken
assumption that it was the role of the federal district court to review
and revise the decision of the Supreme Court of Arizona on the issue
presented to that court under the full faith and credit clause."' 10
In First Tennessee Bank NA. Memphis v. Smith, a
Mississippi probate judgment preceded an Arkansas probate
judgment, which led to a federal interpleader action."' The Arkansas
courts, right up to the state supreme court, had refused to recognize
the Mississippi judgment because of lack of jurisdiction.112 The
aggrieved bank then had petitioned for certiorari, but the U.S.
106. See 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4404, at 65-67; cf PETER HAY,
PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 24.29, at
1485 (5th ed. 2010) (seeing her suggestion as foreclosed by Treinies).
107. 419 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1969).
108. Id. at 255-57.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 258.
111. 766 F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1985).
112. Id. at 255-58.
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Supreme Court denied the petition.13 The federal courts applied the
Arkansas judgment as last-in-time.114
4. U.S. Summary
Even if some authorities still equivocate on the Ginsburg and
foreign exceptions, the blackletter American rule for American
judgments is last-in-time." 5 As I have just argued, the Ginsburg
exception is unsound and unsupported. But as I shall soon argue,
American courts should be wary about extending the last-in-time rule
to foreign-nation judgments. 116
Whose law is dictating this rule and any exceptions? The
governing law is the recognition law of F-3." 7 But that law may be
subject to external constraints imposed by higher law. That is, this
firmly established last-in-time rule, within the United States, is a
matter of constitutional law under the Full Faith and Credit Clause in
the interstate setting; a matter of the Full Faith and Credit Act and
federal res judicata doctrine in the state-federal, federal-state, and
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Rash v. Rash, 173 F.3d 1376 (11th Cir. 1999) (involving a sequence
of Florida, New Jersey, and Middle District of Florida marital actions, where the
benefitee of the F-1 judgment had raised it unsuccessfully in F-2), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 1077 (2000); Sydoriak v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 879 A.2d 494, 500 n.7
(Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (involving a sequence of three Connecticut zoning actions,
where the benefitee of the F-1 judgment had failed to raise it in F-2); ROBERT L.
FELIX & RALPH U. WHITTEN, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 42 (6th ed. 2011);
HAY ET AL., supra note 106, § 24.29, at 1484-85; RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §11.3 (6th ed. 2010); 18 WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 20, § 4404, at 60 n.23, § 4423, at 619 n.31 (citing many cases). The
entirety of discussion on the rule in DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE:
PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 132 n.20 (2001), follows:
If two inconsistent judgments are rendered in a single
jurisdiction, the later of the two is the one entitled to preclusive
effect. See RSJ § 15. The Supreme Court, in interpreting the
constitutional obligation of Full Faith and Credit, has made this
rule applicable to sister state judgments---even when the losing
party in the second action tried without success to invoke the
rules of preclusion in that action. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining
Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939).
116. See infra Part III-B.
117. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 450 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST.
1934); FELIX & WHITTEN, supra note 115, § 50; see CLERMONT, supra note 23, at
434-35 (explaining that in federal diversity actions, F-3's recognition law will be
the local state's law).
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federal-federal permutations; or a matter of highly uniform state
law if F-2 and F-3 are the same U.S. state.119
This governing law on recognition needs to be distinguished
from other choices of law. Recognition for present purposes means
only whether F-3 will look to a prior judgment, provided that it is
valid, final, and preclusive under applicable law. A valid judgment is
one of sufficient quality to withstand an attack in the form of a
request for relief from judgment, which will typically lie only for
lack of jurisdiction or notice and not for other error. 120 A final
judgment is one that is not tentative or provisional, which in the
United States generally means it was the trial court's last word on the
merits.1 2 1 Preclusion turns on all the rules and exceptions of res
judicata law.122
When F-3 faces the question of whether F-2's judgment is
valid and final, it normally should apply the law of F-2 (which is
subject to any applicable external restraints, such as due process and
other federal provisions imposed on and becoming part of the F-2's
law).1 2 3 When F-3 faces the question of the extent or reach of res
judicata based on F-2's judgment, it normally should apply the res
judicata law that F-2 would apply (including any applicable external
restraints). 124 Thus, once over the initial recognition hurdle, the basic
approach is retroverse, in the sense of turning backward to look at F-
118. See FIELD ET AL., supra note 27, at 564, 891-905 (giving controlling law
for the four basic permutations); see also id. at 905-906 (treating tribal courts).
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 15 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
Compare K.D. Kerameus, Res Judicata: A Foreign Lawyer's Impressions of Some
Louisiana Problems, 35 LA. L. REv. 1151 (1975) (describing old civilian
approach), with 1 LA.. CIV. L. TREATISE, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6:7 (2d ed. 2008)
(describing the state's shift in 1990 to common-law preclusion).
120. CLERMONT, supra note 23, at 381-84.
121. Id.at384-85.
122. Id. at 374-78.
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 92-93, 107 (AM.
LAW INST. 1971); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 481(1), 482 (AM. LAW INST. 1987); see WILLIAM M. RICHMAN,
WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS & CHRISTOPHER A. WHYTOCK, UNDERSTANDING
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 115 [b], [d] (4th ed. 2013) (discussing determination of lack
of finality in a prior forum and how personal and subject-matter jurisdictional
issues can impact the determination).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 94-97 (AM. LAW
INST. 1971) (amended 1988); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 481(1) cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1987); see HAY ET AL.,
supra note 106, § 24.2, at 1440-41, § 24.4, at 1444-45, § 24.29, at 1484 n.4
(discussing the application of the Restatement provisions).
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2's view of its own judgment: F-3 lets F-2's law decide what F-2
conclusively adjudicated.1 25
C. Comparative Picture
Before getting to how American courts should treat
inconsistent foreign-nation judgments, I need to take a look at how
the rest of the world handles the problem of inconsistent judgments.
This comparative study will shed light backward on the rationales
and development of the American last-in-time rule, as well as
forward on treatment of foreign-nation judgments.
In brief, the rest of the world does not follow our last-in-time
rule. They follow a first-in-time rule. This comparison reinforces the
feeling that our rule is a rather arbitrary one.
1. England and Most of Its Progeny
English and Commonwealth law on res judicata is middlingly
expansive.1 26 It was slower to develop than American law, and still
does not reach as far.1 27 It provides fairly narrow forms of claim
preclusion and mutual issue preclusion.' 28 Yet, it seems poised to
expand res judicata further.1 29
On the problem of inconsistent judgments, England's
treatises' 30 and international casesl 3 1 make clear that it follows the
125. See RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS:
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE § 4 (AM. LAW INST. 2006)
(proposing this approach with respect to recognition of foreign judgments); Robert
C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgments: Whose Law?, 70
IOWA L. REV. 53, 70-76 (1984) (discussing the application of this approach in a
foreign-judgment context).
126. See Casad, supra note 125, at 62-63 (discussing English and
Commonwealth law).
127. Kevin M. Clermont, Res Judicata as Requisitefor Justice, 68 RUTGERS
U. L. REV. 1067, 1071-73, 1094-96 (2016).
128. Id. at 1094-95.
129. See id. at 1095-96 (describing the move toward claim preclusion and
nonparty use of preclusion).
130. See PETER R. BARNETT, RES JUDICATA, ESTOPPEL, AND FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS: THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 4.72 (2001) ("Certainly if there are c6nflicting foreign
judgments, each pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction, the earlier
judgment is recognized and given effect to the exclusion of the latter judgment.");
K.R. HANDLEY, SPENCER BOWER AND HANDLEY: RES JUDICATA § 17.15 (4th ed.
2009) (stating that if the judgments relate to the same subject matter, the earlier
prevails over the later).
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first-in-time approach. It seemingly does so on the undertheorized
idea that once things are settled, they should remain settled. But it
seems to occur to no one that a subsequent decision of nonpreclusion
might itself be entitled to preclusion. The Privy Council explained
the split from the American approach:
Some reference was made in the course of
argument to the position in the law of the United
States of America, where the last-in-time rule appears
to be applied in the case of conflicting judgments, at
least when the matter arises in an inter-state context
where the "full faith and credit" clause of the
Constitution applies.... The rationale of the rule
appears to be that the second judgment has the effect
of deciding that the first judgment does not constitute
res judicata so that the second constitutes res judicata
of that issue as well as of any others that may have
been raised. This is so whether or not the issue of res
judicata was argued in the second proceeding by the
party who was successful in the first, because on
ordinary principles a party is not entitled to raise in a
later proceeding a point which was open to him in an
earlier one but which he did not take. Their Lordships
do not consider that the position in the United States
is of assistance for present purposes ... 132
Worth noting is that in the international cases generating the
first-in-time rule, the first judgment was most often an English
judgment. 133
English law provides the possibility of cross-estoppel,
whereby the failure by the winner in F-i to raise res judicata in F-2
will equitably estop that party, and so F-2 will be the preclusive
131. See Vervaeke v. Smith [1983] 1 AC 145 (HL) (applying first-in-time
rule to sequence of English judgment, Belgian judgment, and English action on
validity of marriage); E.D. & F. Man (Sugar) Ltd. v. Haryanto [1991] 1 Lloyd's
Rep. 429 (CA) (applying first-in-time rule to sequence of English judgment,
Indonesian judgment, and English action on validity of contracts).
132. Showlag v. Mansour [1995] 1 AC 431, 443 (PC) (appeal taken from
Jersey) (applying first-in-time rule to sequence of English judgment, Egyptian
judgment, and Jersey action on who owns bank accounts).
133. Note that in all three of the leading cases in the two preceding footnotes,
the first-in-time judgment was English.
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judgment. 1 3 4 In other words, here England applies a last-in-time rule.
These cross-estoppel cases most often are domestic cases. Their rule
makes much sense. Failure to raise res judicata is a solid basis for
waiver. Just like any other defense, the benefitee is obliged to raise
or lose it.
Canada, as a federal country, provides an interesting
variation. Its res judicata is founded on the English approach, 1 35
although it is not immune to influences from the more expansive
American approach.1 3 6 For two foreign-nation judgments or two
intraprovincial judgments, a Canadian province follows England's
first-in-time rule.1 3 7
The curious thing for an American, however, is that the
Canadian federation does not have a full faith and credit provision.
The provinces treat judgments from other provinces as foreign
judgments.1 3 8 When a province's judgment is inconsistent with
another province's judgment or any other foreign judgment, the
134. See Langdon v. Richards (1917) 33 TLR 325 (KB) (holding the
government waived its right to res judicata by failing to raise the first judgment in
the second action in a sequence of three English actions, and then apparently using
F-2's result to dictate result in F-3); cf Magrath v. Hardy (1838) 132 Eng. Rep.
990, 996 (holding in F-2 that a party failing to raise res judicata "has waived any
benefit he might have derived from the estoppel"); HANDLEY, supra note 130, §
17.16 (seeming to suggest that the cross-estoppel "sets the matter at large" without
any preclusion, but actually speaking of the situation in F-2).
135. See generally DONALD J. LANGE, THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA IN
CANADA (2000).
136. See JANET WALKER ET AL., THE CiviL LITIGATION PROCESS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 330 (7th ed. 2010) ("Pulled between the traditional rigidity of English
law and the modem flexibility of US law, Canadian courts have developed this
area of the law cautiously, borrowing elements from both the United States and the
United Kingdom and developing a distinctively Canadian approach to issue
estoppel.").
137. See Peter J. Cavanagh & Chloe A. Snider, Canada, in ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN 29 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 2014, at 28, 32 (Mark
Moedritzer & Kay C. Whittaker eds., 2013) ("Where a foreign judgment that is
sought to be recognised conflicts with a prior judgment involving the same parties
or their privies, and each judgment (i) was pronounced by a court of competent
jurisdiction and (ii) is final and not open to impeachment, the general rule is that
the first in time must be given effect to the exclusion of the later in time.").
138. See Konstantinos D. Kerameus, Enforcement Proceedings, in 16
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10-9,
at 8, § 10-25, at 19 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 2014); cf Morguard Invs. Ltd. v. De
Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 (Can.) (urging in dicta an approach based on full
faith and credit). Registration statutes do simplify the process of enforcement for
other provinces' judgments. See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Canada, 38 CAN. B. REv. 68 (1960) (discussing registration statutes).
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province will follow its own judgment, regardless of whether it was
first or second. 139
2. Civil-Law Countries
Civil-law res judicata is relatively narrow in scope. Its aim is
merely to keep a cause of action, once resolved for either plaintiff or
defendant, from being reconsidered. There is little by way of
collateral estoppel and jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction, and no
res judicata as to res judicata determinations.1 40 However, there are
signs in a number of countries of a doctrine on the brink of
141
expansion."
On the problem of inconsistent judgments, a striking aspect is
the civil law's lack of discussion of the problem as a matter of
domestic law. The domestic doctrine, such as it is today, favors the
first-in-time rule. When inconsistent judgments inevitably came to
present themselves in international litigation, the civilians had to
confront it consciously. But defensibly parochial impulses were then
in play, so that the codes tended to go with the local judgment
whether first or last.
Why does this problem seem smaller to civilians? The
explanation might be that we are more comfortable in
acknowledging inconsistencies. More probably, the problem arises
139. See Ryder Gilliland & Peter Smiley, Canada, in ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 2016, at 2.7 (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-
areas/enforcement-of-foreign-judgments/enforcement-of-foreign-judgments-2016/
canada ("Where there is a conflicting local judgment between the parties or there
are local proceedings pending between the parties to the extent that the judgment is
not final and conclusive, a foreign judgment will not be recognised or enforced in
Canada."); see also Civil Code of Qu6bec, S.Q. 1991, c 64, art 3155 (Can.) ("A
decision rendered outside Qu6bec is recognized and, where applicable, declared
enforceable by the Quebec authority, except in the following cases . .. (4) a
dispute between the same parties, based on the same facts and having the same
subject has given rise to a decision rendered in Qudbec, whether or not it has
become final, is pending before a Qu6bec authority, first seized of the dispute, or
has been decided in a third State and the decision meets the conditions necessary
for it to be recognized in Qudbec . . . ."). This code provision extends the
preference for local proceedings into the arena of pending cases, so that the foreign
judgment must bow to a case pending in Quebec. See Can. Post Corp. v. Lpine,
[2009] 1 S.C.R. 549, para. 55 (Can.) (applying this part of art. 3155(4) so as to
prefer a Quebec proceeding over an Ontario judgment).
140. See Clermont, supra note 127, at 1096-98 (discussing res judicata in
civil law countries).
141. See id at 1099-100; ef Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for
judicial matters] le civ., May 25, 2016, [2016] I.L. Pr. 27, para. 7 (applying
jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction to an English judgment).
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less often. Why? I think the major reason is the limited scope of their
res judicata. Narrower res judicata means that res judicata will apply
less often in a second action, to say nothing of a third action.
Moreover, without collateral estoppel, the problem would arise only
in the more unlikely scenario of repetitive assertion of the same
cause of action involving the same parties. In such a scenario the
doctrines of res judicata and lis pendens usually will work well to
prevent inconsistency from arising in the first place. The doctrines
will work even better given that civil-law judges in F-2 can raise
them sua sponte,14 2 and given that the judges sitting without a jury
will avoid inconsistent determinations thanks to the prior judgment
being admissible in evidence on the merits.1 43 Finally, civil-law
countries define "inconsistent" narrowly.'" The tendency is to
require something like legal consequences that mutually exclude
each other. 14 5
Take Germany as the prime example. 146 Unlike Canadian and
U.S. federalism, Germany treats a judgment of any German state as a
German judgment, automatically enforceable anywhere in the
country. 14 7 "Conflicts between judgments rendered by different
German courts are usually resolved according to the priority
principle (Priorititsprinzip)-'first in time, first in right."' 1 4 8
Although the same principle applies to conflicts between foreign
judgments, when the inconsistency is between any German judgment
and a foreign judgment, the German judgment prevails. The relevant
code prohibits recognition of a foreign judgment between the same
parties on the same subject matter if the "judgment is incompatible
142. See PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STTRNER, GERMAN CIVI JUSTICE 547-
49 (2004) (treating lis pendens); Albrecht Zeuner & Harald Koch, Effects of
Judgments (Res Judicata), in 16 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW: CIVI PROCEDURE §§ 9-34 to -39, -47 (Mauro Cappelletti ed.,
2014) (treating res judicata, but noting that France is an exception to the sua sponte
practice).
143. Clermont, supra note 127, at 1099.
144. See MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 142, at 534-35 (describing
German law on res judicata as narrow and discussing the German conception of
irreconcilable judgments).
145. See Case 145/86, Hoffman v. Krieg, 1988 E.C.R. 645 (defining
"irreconcilable" judgments as having mutually exclusive legal consequences).
146. See MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 142, at 525-41 (discussing
German recognition of foreign judgments).
147. Kerameus, supra note 138, § 10-9, at 8, § 10-25, at 18.
148. MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 142, at 534 (citing German Code of
Civil Procedure [ZPO] Jan. 30, 1877, § 580(7)(a)).
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with a judgment delivered in Germany, or with an earlier judgment
handed down abroad that is to be recognized."l49
Basing its recognition law on Germany's, Japan follows the
same first-in-time approach.1 5 0 Japan also nicely demonstrates the
unwillingness of civil-law courts to recognize or enforce a foreign
judgment that is inconsistent with a local judgment. The illustrative
case is Marubeni America Corp. v. Kabushiki Kaisha Kansai
Tekkasho.' 5 1 In light of the occasionally incensed reactions of the
pertinent law review commentary,1 52 I do not present this case as
fully representative of Japanese law. Nevertheless, the particulars of
the case merit consideration.
In 1968 Jerry Deutsch, an employee of the Boeing Company
in Washington State, mangled his hand in a large mechanical
press.1 53 Boeing had bought the press from West Coast Machinery
Co. (a Washington corporation), which had bought it from Marubeni
America (a New York subsidiary corporation), which had bought it
from Marubeni Japan (a Japanese parent corporation), which had
bought it from the manufacturer Kansai Iron Works (a Japanese
corporation in Osaka).1 54
F-1: Deutsch sued West Coast and Marubeni America in a
state court of Washington, alleging a defective press and requesting
149. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIvIL PROCEDURE], §
328(1)(3) (Ger.). This code provision continues on to make a foreign judgment
bow to ongoing German proceedings. See MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 142, at
526 n.151; cf supra note 139 (describing Canada's similar approach).
150. Morio Takeshita, The Recognition of Foreign Judgments by the
Japanese Courts, 39 JAP. ANN. INT'L L. 55, 56, 71 (1996). For China, a country on
whose res judicata I have written, Clermont, supra note 127, at 1126-40, the
approach to inconsistent judgments will likely develop along the same civil-law
lines. See RE HUANG, INTERREGIONAL RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL
AND COMMERCIAL JUDGMENTS 244 (2014) (looking to future); ZHENG SOPHIA
TANG, YONGPING XIAO & ZHENGXIN Huo, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 169-71 (2016) (same).
151. Osaka Chih6 Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.] Dec. 22, 1977, Case No. 4257
(Wa) of 1975, 361 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 127 (Japan).
152. See Takao Sawaki, Battle of Lawsuits: Lis Pendens in International
Relations, 23 JAP. ANN. INT'L L. 17, 17-19, 28 & n.25 (1979-1980) (criticizing
this case at length); Takeshita, supra note 150, at 71 & n.16 ("This judgment of the
Osaka District Court seems to be strongly in favor of a Japanese judgment in the
sense that a foreign judgment may be rejected even if it was finally and
conclusively given before the relevant Japanese judgment.. . . Giving priority to a
Japanese judgment in such a way as the Osaka District Court ruled would
excessively jeopardize the international harmony of decisions . . .. In addition, that
solution is inconsistent with the principle of resjudicata.").
153. Deutsch v. W. Coast Mach. Co., 497 P.2d 1311, 1312 (Wash. 1972).
154. Id. at 1312-13.
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$275,000.'15 By service in Japan, Marubeni America impleaded
Kansai, which attacked jurisdiction.15 6 The Supreme Court of
Washington upheld jurisdictional power on the ground that Kansai
had transacted business in Washington by building the press to
Boeing's extensive specifications, by sending to Washington its
engineers to test and inspect the press and to oversee repairs, and by
sending replacement parts to Washington; moreover, the court found
the exercise of jurisdiction not to be unreasonable in view of
Kansai's other extensive business in the United States, the burden on
Marubeni America, and the location of evidence. 5 7 On September
17, 1974, the trial court awarded Marubeni America a judgment
against Kansai for $86,000.1ss
F-2: Meanwhile, Kansai was not asleep in Japan. It sued
Marubeni America in the Osaka District Court to declare nonliability
for indemnification. 15 9 After stretching to find jurisdiction, the
Japanese court followed precedent to reject a lis pendens defense by
construing the word "court" in the code's prohibition to mean that
the prior action had to be pending in a Japanese court.1 60 The
Washington judgment, valid and final under Washington law, was
not final under Japanese law because there was still time to appeal.161
On October 14, 1974, the Osaka District Court ruled that Marubeni
America had no right to indemnity under Japanese contract or tort
law. 162
F-3: Next, Marubeni America sued Kansai upon its
Washington judgment in that same Japanese court. In 1977, the court
rejected that claim, denying recognition on the ground that the
Washington judgment was inconsistent with a Japanese judgment (its
own 1974 judgment) and hence was contrary to the public policy of
Japan, regardless of the two judgments' sequencing. 16 3
155. Id. at 1313.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1315.
158. Sawaki, supra note 152, at 17.
159. See JOSEPH W.S. DAvis, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN JAPAN 349 (1996)
(describing this common move "as a tactic to thwart the recognition of foreign
judgments").
160. See MINJI SOSHOHO [MINSOHO] [C. Civ. PRO.] art. 142 ("No party shall
file a suit concerning a matter presently pending before a court.").
161. See TAKAAKi HATTORI & DAN FENNO HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE
IN JAPAN § 7.09[3], [8][a] (Yasuhei Taniguchi et al. eds., rev. 2d ed. 2009)
(discussing finality prerequisite).
162. Sawaki, supra note 152, at 18.
163. See MINJI SOSHOHO [MINSOHO] [C. CIV. PRO.] art. 118(iii) (stating as a
requirement for recognition that "the contents of the judgment and the procedures
for litigation are not contrary to the public order or morals of Japan"); HATrORI &
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By any view, this ten-year battle of lawsuits is not a pretty
picture. In the U.S. view, the Japanese court in 1974 should probably
have given res judicata effect to the Washington judgment. But the
Japanese court refused to go that route, and the result was
inconsistent judgments. In the Japanese view, the Japanese court in
1977 was likely right in preferring its own prior judgment.
The civilians' preference for local judgments is further
indulged by their willingness, as seen in Marubeni, to apply their
own law to the validity, finality, and bindingness of the foreign-
nation's judgment. 16 The result might then be that the foreign
nation's judgment never gets into the running as an inconsistent
judgment.
3. European Union
Under the 2015 revision of the Brussels Regulation, a
member state must not recognize or enforcel 6 5 another member
state's judgment "if the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment
given between the same parties in the Member State addressed" 6 6 or
"if the judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in
another Member State or in a third State involving the same cause of
action and between the same parties, provided that the earlier
judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the
Member State addressed." 1 6 7 Irreconcilability arises when the two
judgments entail "mutually exclusive legal consequences."168
The Regulation thus follows the first-in-time rule, except
when F-2 and F-3 are courts of the same member state. However, the
Regulation fails to cover the situation where F-i and F-2 are courts
of the same member state, which leaves the problem to the national
law of F-1 and F-2.' 69 F-3's national law governs when neither F-1
HENDERSON, supra note 161, § .14.03[1][a] & n.260 (discussing this public policy
exception).
164. See FIELD ET AL., supra note 27, at 913-15 (contrasting U.S. and foreign
approaches); Casad, supra note 125, at 75 (suggesting that foreign countries apply
their own law, regardless of what they say they are doing).
165. Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the
Council, 2012 O.J. (L 351) arts. 45-46.
166. Id. art. 45(1)(c).
167. Id. art. 45(1)(d).
168. PETER STONE, EU PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 243 (3d ed. 2014)
(discussing Case 145/86, Hoffman v. Krieg, 1988 E.C.R. 645); BRUSSELS IBIS
REGULATION 919-28 (Ulrich Magnus & Peter Mankowski eds., 2016).
169., See Case C-157/12, Salzgitter Mannesmann Handel GmbH v. SC
Laminorul SA, [2014] 1 WLR 904, para. 26 (EU) (involving two Romanian courts
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nor F-2 is a member state. The national law will normally provide
that first-in-time governs.17 0
These EU provisions followed naturally from English and
civil-law traditions. First, those traditions follow the first-in-time rule
(prior tempore, potior jure).17 1 Second, the indulgence for local
judgments over foreign judgments is typical of international
conventions. 172
4. Comparative Summary
Occasional exceptions aside, the national and EU law that
generally prevails in Europe, including in England,1 73 fits a simple
and coherent pattern: the first judgment governs-unless one of the
inconsistent judgments is a local judgment, which then prevails. At a
glance, the situation there stands in what seems to be stark contrast to
the law of the United States.
Why? In this corner of the law, the solution is path-
dependent. A legal system's rule arises in a certain context, and then
it proceeds to have a life of its own.
as F-i and F-2 and a German court as F-3, with the European court concluding that
the EU Regulation art. 45 did not apply and saying that "the recognition and
enforcement procedures enable a judgment to have the same effect in the Member
State addressed as it would have had in the Member State of origin").
170. See, e.g., MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 142, at 534 (noting that the
first-in-time rule governs in Germany, but there are exceptions).
171. Interestingly, however, the EU sometimes breaks with the orthodox first-
in-time line. Its Regulation Concerning Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and the Matters of Parental
Responsibility adopts a last-in-time for judgments on parental responsibility for the
care and custody of children. No. 2201/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 338) art. 23(e)-(f); see
STONE, supra note 168, at 474 ("[T]he Regulation accepts the inherent nature of
custody orders, as being open to modification by reason of a subsequent change in
circumstances.").
172. RONALD A. BRAND & PAUL HERRUP, THE 2005 HAGUE CONVENTION ON
CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS 119-22, 227, 278-79 (2008); Ginsburg, supra
note 75, at 804 & n.33; cf A GLOBAL LAW ON JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS:
LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 305 (John J. Barcel6 III & Kevin M. Clermont eds.,
2002) (setting out art. 28(1)(b) of the draft jurisdiction-and-judgments treaty,
which more simply provided that recognition or enforcement may be refused if
"the judgment is inconsistent with a judgment rendered, either in the State
addressed or in another State, provided that in the latter case the judgment is
capable of being recognized or enforced in the State addressed").
173. See Mukarrum Ahmed, Brexit and English Jurisdiction Agreements: The
Post Referendum Legal Landscape, http://ssm.com/abstract-2839342 (Sept. 15,
2016) (discussing the impact of the EU exit on the laws of England); Andrew
Dickinson, Back to the Future-The UK's EU Exit and the Conflict of Laws,
http://ssm.com/abstract-2786888 (May 31, 2016) (same).
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The early cases in the United States were domestic cases
involving the benefitee's failure to assert res judicata in F-2. 17 4 For
these, last-in-time seemed the natural answer. Because of the
expansiveness of American res judicata, the cases presenting
inconsistent judgments multiplied and last-in-time became
entrenched. Because America's devotion to res judicata meant that
we should honor decisions about res judicata, last-in-time came to
apply in situations where the benefitee asserted res judicata
unsuccessfully in F-2.
Elsewhere in the world, the problem tended to present itself
with obviousness in international cases, and parochialism defensibly
led to a preference for any local judgment. A lesser devotion to res
judicata led to a first-in-time rule when the time came to backfill a
solution for the problem's rarer contexts. This solution could be
leavened by notions of waiver, however, as achieved by cross-
estoppel in England where a relatively broader res judicata has led to
a more developed law on inconsistent judgments.
But perhaps the difference between the American solution
and that of the rest of the world is not as stark as a first glance
suggests. If the United States were not to apply its last-in-time rule
sometimes when a foreign-nation judgment was involved, and if
other countries would adopt the British notion of cross-estoppel, the
difference between the United States and the rest of world would
become not at all stark. Indeed, the difference would shrink to the
realm of cases where F-1 and F-2 are both domestic and F-2 actually
decided, rightly or wrongly, to reject the benefitee's assertion of res
judicata based on F-i 's judgment. There American law alone opts for
the last-in-time rather than the first-in-time.
That small remaining difference is explainable by the driving
force of the American ardor for res judicata. It leads us to apply
preclusion even to determinations about res judicata. We give
definitive credit to F-2's resolution of the res judicata effect of F-i's
judgment, while the rest of the world does not. Here lies the true
difference between the United States and the rest of the world.
Because we accept F-2's decision on res judicata, we choose last-in-
time as the background rule, and they choose first-in-time.
174. See supra II.B.1.
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III. LIMITING THE RULE FOR FOREIGN-NATION JUDGMENTS
Say, first, Pierre of France sues Doug of New York in a New
York court for a large installment of interest on a French-made loan,
and he loses by a defense of release of the obligation to pay interest.
So, second, for all interest that has by then fallen in arrears, Pierre
sues Doug in France and wins after the French court refuses to
recognize the New York judgment and finds no release. Naturally
enough, third, Pierre sues Doug in New York upon the French
judgment to enforce it where Doug's assets are, and also sues Doug
upon the underlying claim for all interest due, but he encounters a
fight over recognition. Doug invokes the first New York judgment.
Pierre invokes the second judgment, even though it likely is not
preclusive under French law on the finding of no-release, 175 to argue
that the later French decision should prevail over the prior New York
judgment.
This hypothetical emerged during a classroom discussion. It
struck me then as a situation where the arguments for the last-in-time
rule vaporized. The second judgment being nonpreclusive and
foreign seemed to scream for New York to honor its own prior
judgment. Now to support that intuitive outcome, I shall separately
consider how the two features of F-2's judgment-it is nonpreclusive
and it is foreign-together destroy the rationales for the last-in-time
rule.
A. Nonpreclusive Judgments
The Pierre v. Doug hypothetical raises the question of what
to do with the last-in-time judgment if it is nonpreclusive. A
conceivable approach would be to say it "doth put the matter at
large," 7 6 the old expression meaning that no preclusion applies. The
idea would be that the last-in-time judgment controls, and it says
there is to be no preclusion. But no case takes that approach.
Moreover, looking to F-2's nonpreclusion would undo the rationale
175. Because these are different claims, and because French res judicata
provides little in the way of collateral estoppel, the F-2 judgment would probably
not be issue-preclusive in F-3 on the claim for interest. FIELD ET AL., supra note
27, at 886-88; PETER HERZOG & MARTHA WESER, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE
554 n.18 (Hans Smit ed., 1967); Clermont, supra note 127, at 1096-98; Zeuner &
Koch, supra note 142, §§ 9-70 to -76. As to defeating the action upon the French
judgment, see infra note 215.
176. 2 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND; OR, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON § 667, at 352b (London, J. &
W.T. Clarke, 19th ed. 1832) (1628).
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for having some priority rule, namely, that one of the preceding
judgments should be the final word. Therefore, if the last-in-time
judgment is nonpreclusive, F-3 should look to the first-in-time
judgment if it would be preclusive.
This rather obvious qualification is better handled as part of
the rule rather than as an exception to the rule. Accordingly,
Professor Ginsburg could begin her article with this sentence:
"Under traditional res judicata doctrine, where there are conflicting
judgments and each would be entitled to preclusive effect if it stood
alone, the last in time controls in subsequent litigation." 1 7 7
Indeed, without a preclusiveness requirement, the last-in-time
rule would be far too broad. Many subsequent determinations could
be inconsistent in some sense and would potentially undermine a
judgment's res judicata effects widely. Thus, preclusiveness should
enter into inconsistency's definition. That is, to be inconsistent
means that the prior judgments would preclusively resolve the claim
or issue differently in F-3. If F-I or F-2 does not yield preclusion on
the claim or issue, there is no inconsistency, and hence the last-in-
time rule does not come into play. For example, a decision that did
not get reduced to a judgment would not be considered inconsistent.
Or a judgment that is not recognizable, valid, or final would not
come down to F-3. Likewise, a decision in a forum with a res
judicata law too narrow to preclude the claim or issue would not
come down to F-3.
An illustration would be where Driver 1 sues Driver 2 for
negligence and wins, establishing negligence and the absence of
contributory negligence. Passenger next sues Drivers 1 and 2 for
negligence in. the same accident and wins, establishing negligence
against both. Then Driver 1 sues Driver 2 for contribution on the
second judgment based on comparative fault. Even though Driver 2
might be able invoke the second judgment against Driver 1 for some
purposes,17 8 that judgment did not decide their comparative fault. So,
Driver 1 should be able to invoke the first judgment to establish
Driver 2's sole fault. 17 9
177. Ginsburg, supra note 75, at 798 (emphasis added).
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 38 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
179. Cf Brightheart v. McKay, 420 F.2d 242, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(suggesting this solution); Neenan v. Woodside Astoria Transp. Co., 184 N.E. 744,
745 (N.Y. 1933) (treating the different situation of pro rata contribution). The best
counterargument is that the conflicting determinations call for relitigation, but that
is not the usual route taken by our res judicata law. See supra notes 42-43.
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An international example lies in Ackerman v. Ackerman.18 0
First, the wife obtained a small New York judgment against the
husband for failure to pay support. 81 Second, she sued the husband
in California upon that judgment and for big amounts subsequently
due, but her attorney mistakenly dismissed that action with
prejudice.1 8 2 Third, she sued in England for those subsequent
amounts due, and the court rejected the California judgment and
awarded her over a million dollars.1 83 Fourth, she sued back in New
York upon the English judgment, and the husband removed to the
Southern District of New York on the basis of diversity. 1 8 4 The
husband argued: "The English judgment. . . , not being that of a
sister state, is not constitutionally entitled to full faith and credit, nor
to superseding effect under the last-in-time rule."185 The district court
nevertheless applied the last-in-time rule, observing that the English
court had proceeded impartially, sensitively, and soundly. The court
of appeals ducked that "knotty question,"l 86 and instead ruled that
New York would look to California res judicata law under which the
California judgment was not preclusive.18 7 With the California case
off the table, there were no inconsistent judgments and so the English
judgment governed.' 8 8
Ackerman illustrates the important point that while we search
for the proper formal rule, we cannot blind ourselves to legal realism.
Both the district court and the court of appeals wanted to apply the
English result. They differed only in how to manipulate the rules so
as to get there. The widest route to manipulation is nonpreclusion. A
court wishing to evade a prior determination would simply identify a
defect in the prior judgment's recognizability, validity, finality, or
bindingness, which is often doable thanks to those doctrines'
complicatedness. So, where F-i faces a decision from F-2 that
disrespected F-i's prior judgment, F-1 might very well be able to
ignore F-2's "nonpreclusive" judgment without openly flouting its
duty to give full faith and credit.' 8 9 This dose of realism thus drives
180. 676 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1982).
181. Id. at 899-900.
182. Id. at 900-01.
183. Id. at 901.
184. Id. at 901.
185. Id. at 903.
186. Id. at 902 n.5.
187. Id. at 905 (ruling that the wife had no meaningful opportunity to litigate
in California).
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., First Ala. Bank of Montgomery, N.A. v. Parsons Steel, Inc.,
825 F.2d 1475 (11th Cir. 1987) (treating, on remand, the Alabama judgment as
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home the significance of the formal rule's prerequisite of
preclusiveness as a path to the desired result.
This subsection's detour into nonpreclusion allows us better
to understand the last-in-time rule. The law in the United States is
that the last judgment governs-when two prior judgments offer
preclusion of a claim or issue but would preclude differently.19 0 This
detour is also an appropriate introduction to foreign-nation
judgments because often the foreign judgment will be nonpreclusive
under the foreign nation's narrow res judicata law, and thus not even
qualify as an inconsistent judgment.
B. American v. Foreign Judgments
"One of the key problems facing international litigants is the
possibility of irreconcilable judgments or proceedings arising out of
parallel litigation."1 91 How should American law address an
inconsistent foreign-nation judgment?
Because our conflicts law developed in the interstate setting
rather than the international setting, our law does not show an
instinctive wariness of foreign-nation judgments. The last-in-time
rule is well-established enough that American courts presume it to
apply even to international litigation, at least when two inconsistent
foreign-nation judgments arrive at an American court. 192 The
rationales of the last-in-time rule carry over from the all-domestic
setting to this all-foreign setting.
non-final in a sequence of Middle District of Alabama, Alabama, and Middle
District of Alabama); cf, e.g., Herbstein v. Bruetman, 266 B.R. 676, 686 (N.D. Ill.
2001) (treating, on appeal, the Argentine judgment as non-final in a sequence of
Southern District of New York, Argentina, and Northern District of Illinois), aff'd,
32 F. App'x 158 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 878 (2002).
190. See, e.g., United States v. Wexler, 8 F.2d 880 (E.D.N.Y. 1925) (looking
to F-i in a sequence of divorce for adultery; nonappealable, nonreviewable, and
hence nonpreclusive state naturalization proceeding approving morality; and
federal cancellation of naturalization for immorality); Deere & Co. v. First Nat'l
Bank of Clarksdale, 12 So. 3d 516, 522 (Miss. 2009) ("We begin by pointing out
the obvious: The 'last-in-time' rule applies only where res judicata could have
applied."); Algazy v. Algazy, 135 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (disregarding F-2
and F-3 judgments in fourfold sequence of Nevada divorce, Romanian decree
without jurisdiction, French decree without finality, and New York action), aff'd
mem., 142 N.Y.S.2d 365 (App, Div. 1955).
191. S.I. Strong, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in U.S.
Courts: Problems and Possibilities, 33 REV. LITIG. 45, 117 (2014).
192. See, e.g., Ambatielos v. Found. Co., 116 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1952)
(involving a sequence of contract actions in England, Greece, England, and New
York).
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Of course, the compulsion to follow the last-in-time rule
lessens as we move from full faith and credit into the realm of
comity.193 The American court can consider local interests and
policies in the context of special circumstances.' 9 4 Thus, the last-in-
time rule might presumptively apply,' 95 but the American court can
reject the F-2 judgment if F-i's judgment is clearly preferable.1 9 6
193. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) ("'Comity,' in the
legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere
courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws."). See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, Some Observations on the
Economics of Comity, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 147
(Thomas Eger et al. eds., 2014); Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32
HARv. INT'L L.J. 1 (1991).
194. Chromalloy Aeroservs., a Div. of Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp. v.
Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907, 913 (D.D.C. 1996) (involving
arbitration):
"No nation is under an unremitting obligation to enforce
foreign interests which are fundamentally prejudicial to those of
the domestic forum." Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian
World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984). "[C]omity
never obligates a national forum to ignore 'the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws."' Id. at 942 (emphasis added) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113, 164, 16 S. Ct. 139, 143-44, 40 L. Ed. 95 (1895)[)].
Egypt alleges that, "Comity is the chief doctrine of international
law requiring U.S. courts to respect the decisions of competent
foreign tribunals." However, comity does not and may not have
the preclusive effect upon U.S. law that Egypt wishes this Court
to create for-it.
195. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 482(2)(e) cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1987) ("Courts are likely to recognize
the later of two inconsistent foreign judgments, but under Subsection (2)(e) the
court may recognize the earlier judgment or neither of them."); Courtland H.
Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and the Second Restatement of Conflict of
Laws, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 220, 256-57 (1972) (discussing the failure of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to clarify this issue).
196. Cf RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS:
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE § 5(c)(ii) (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
This provision says that F-3 need not recognize a foreign judgment if "the
judgment is irreconcilable with another foreign judgment entitled to recognition or
enforcement under the Act. and involving the same parties." The pertinent
comment explains that the F-3 court "should inquire into the circumstances giving
rise to the inconsistency" and usually should recognize the F-2 judgment only if
the F-2 court had "considered the other judgment or proceeding and declined to
recognize it under standards substantially comparable to the standards set forth in
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"Clearly" serves the purpose of enhancing predictability.
"Preferable" will turn most heavily on how disrespectfully F-2
considered F-I's judgment.
Accordingly, the highly influential Uniform Act on
recognition provides that a foreign-nation judgment need not be
recognized or enforced if "the judgment conflicts with another final
and conclusive judgment." 97 If F-3 does not recognize an F-2
judgment under the Act, then F-3 would look to the F-I judgment.
This provision thus handles two inconsistent foreign-nation
judgments arriving at an American court.
What if, of the two inconsistent judgments, the first is
American and the second is foreign?1 98 Certainly, the flexibility of
comity allows F-3 to disregard the foreign F-2. But the inclination
might still persist to apply the last-in-time rule presumptively in
favor of the foreign-nation judgment. 199 I shall show that the
inclination here is misplaced.
One could indeed argue over whether F-3 must disregard the
F-2 judgment in favor of an otherwise preclusive American judgment
this Act." Id. cmt. j; see Victrix S.S. Co. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709,
713-16 (2d Cir. 1987) (looking to F-1, under federal and state law, in sequence of
Sweden, England, and Southern District of New York, when F-2 had disregarded
F-i's bankruptcy proceeding); cf Films by Jove, Inc. v. Berov, 250 F. Supp. 2d
156, 164-66, 175-77 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (looking to F-1, under federal law, in
sequence of France, France, and Eastern District of New York, when F-2's
"interpretation is contradicted by an earlier ruling of the same court, upheld by the
court of last resort, in a suit involving the same parties and identical legal issues,
and, more significantly, when the interpretation appears very obviously mistaken
based on the more probative evidence of Russian law furnished to this court by
plaintiffs' experts"), motion to vacate denied, 341 F. Supp. 2d 199 (E.D.N.Y.
2004).
197. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT §
4(c)(4) (2005), 13 (pt. II) U.L.A. 28 (Supp. 2015); see UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-
JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(4) (1962), 13 (pt. II) U.L.A. 59 (2002)
(same); Byblos Bank Eur., S.A. v. Sekerbank Turk Anonym Syrketi, 885 N.E.2d
191, 192 (N.Y. 2008) (looking to F-i in sequence of Turkey, Belgium, and New
York, when F-2 had exercised revision aufond and found the Turkish judgment to
be "affected by substantial error").
198. If the first judgment is foreign and the second is American, the last-in-
time rule gives the desirable result. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining
Co., 132 P.2d 70 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942) (involving a sequence of ownership
actions in the Philippines, New York, and California). But that right result derives
less from the reasons for respecting the last judgment, and rather more from the
reasons for preferring the local judgment over the foreign judgment.
199. See Perkins v. DeWitt, 111 N.Y.S.2d 752 (App. Div. 1952) (looking
tentatively to the latest Philippine judgment in a sequence of ownership actions in
the Philippines, New York, Philippines, and New York), rev'g 94 N.Y.S.2d 177
(Sup. Ct. 1950).
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from F-1. This is Ackerman's "knotty question."2 00 This question of
mandatoriness remains an open one, but I shall argue in support of
mandatoriness.
As we have seen, the American Law Institute at first punted
on the application of last-in-time to international litigation. 2 0 1 Then,
in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, the ALI
expressly adopted the discretionary approach of the Uniform Act, 2 0 2
thereafter attracting some case support.2 03 Now, in its proposed
statute on recognition, the ALI has extended the Uniform Act's
approach, by providing, without case citation and only in a comment
to its proposed statute, that F-3 must not respect a foreign-nation
judgment over an American judgment:
If recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment is
sought in a court in the United States and the
judgment is asserted to be irreconcilable with a
judgment rendered by a court in the United States, the
court in the United States is obligated to recognize the
judgment rendered in the United States and deny
200. See supra text accompanying note 186.
201. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 114 cmt. d (AM.
LAW INST. 1971) ("It is uncertain whether the rule of this Section will be applied to
judgments rendered in a foreign nation."); supra text accompanying note 96.
202. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 482(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) ("A court in the United States need not
recognize a judgment of the court of a foreign state if... (e) the judgment conflicts
with another final judgment that is entitled to recognition .... ). The pertinent
comment went on to say: "If a later foreign judgment otherwise entitled to
recognition in a court in the United States conflicts with an earlier sister-State
judgment, there is no principle requiring automatic preference for the sister-State
judgment." Id. cmt. g. But its only support was the lower-court opinion in
Ackerman. See id. reporters' note 4. There was no section comparable to § 482 in
the previous Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, and the new § 482(2)(e)
prompted no debate other than on comment g. See 60 A.L.I. PROC. 508 (1983)
(Prof. Charles Alan Wright) ("But as between a judgment of a sister State and a
foreign judgment, I would think there would be not the slightest doubt you have to
follow, you are constitutionally compelled to follow, the judgment of other State
and to disregard the later judgment of the foreign court.").
203. See, e.g., Derr v. Swarek, 766 F.3d 430, 437 n.4 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing
the Restatement provision in a footnote); In re Bruetman, 259 B.R. 649, 672
(Bankr. N.D. Ill.) (observing, in a sequence of Southern District of New York,
Argentina, and Northern District of Illinois: "Indeed, parties who litigate to a
conclusion in a United States court can hardly expect any United States court to
give effect to a subsequent contrary ruling by a foreign court, and that should not
be done here."), aff'd sub nom. Herbstein v. Bruetman, 266 BR. 676, 686 (N.D.
Ill. 2001) (treating the Argentine judgment as nonfinal), aff'd, 32 F. App'x 158
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 878 (2002).
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recognition or enforcement to the foreign judgment.
This obligation, derived from the command of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution
and the implementing legislation, is applicable
regardless of whether the foreign action or the action
in the United States was commenced first and
regardless of which judgment was first entered.204
In other words, the ALI finally approved the approach
followed in the rest of the world's countries to favor their own
judgments. American courts would be wise to get on this
bandwagon. The rest of the countries may know what they are doing
here. There may even be a value in applying the same rule as other
countries do for local-foreign inconsistencies, In any event, the
rationales for the last-in-time rule do not carry over to this setting,
and so the balance of policies tips to a first-in-time rule. If America
were to get on the bandwagon, we would operate under the scheme
summarized in the following table:
Treatment of Inconsistent Judgments by American F-3
F-1 F-2 Rule
American American Last-in-Time
Foreign-Nation American Last-in-Time
Foreign-Nation Foreign-Nation PresumptivelyLast-in-Time
American Foreign-Nation First-in-Time
First, for the table's last row, the rationale of waiver weakens
considerably when F-2 is a foreign-nation court. Although we have
come to accept the last-in-time rule's forcing attendance in an
204. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS
AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE § 5(c)(ii) cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 2006). The
early drafts provided in blackletter that an American court need not recognize a
foreign-nation judgment irreconcilable with an American judgment, but the
comment said instead that it must not. E.g., id. § 5(b)(ii) cmt. i (AM. LAW INST.
Preliminary Draft No. 1, 2001). In response to arguments made at an annual
meeting, 81 A.L.I. PROC. 292-94 (2004) (Prof. Mary Coombs & Mr. Michael
Marks Cohen), the reference to American judgments dropped out of the
blackletter, leaving just the comment. See RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE reporters'
memorandum, at xviii (AM. LAW INST. Proposed Final Draft, 2005) (noting that the
section was restructured to address the issue).
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American F-2, we should be wary of increasing the compulsion on
someone, who has won in the United States, to show up in the
foreign-nation forum. We should also be wary of compelling
someone, who has shown up abroad, to make what they may view as
a hopeless contention that the foreign court should give res judicata
effect to a prior American judgment. Indeed, it is puzzling how to
contend that failure to argue preclusion under foreign law somehow
constitutes waiver of the full faith and credit argument.
Second, an even more powerful point is that the preclusion
rationale drops out altogether. If F-2 were within the full faith and
credit circle, the binding effect of F-i's judgment would be the same
question whether it is faced by F-2 or by F-3. But the res judicata
question faced by a foreign-nation F-2 is a different question (should
it, under the foreign law, recognize the American F-i judgment?)
from the one faced by an American F-3 (would it, under American
full faith and credit, recognize the American F-1 judgment?). Thus F-
2's res judicata decision should have little or no preclusive effect in
F-3 (even making the unlikely assumption that a foreign nation
would give issue preclusion to its own determinations about res
judicata). Moreover, even if F-2 was wrong under F-2 law in denying
res judicata to F-i's judgment, there was no possibility of getting a
supranational court to correct the denial of preclusion.
Third, it is difficult to believe that looking at the later
judgment is somehow simpler. If F-3 were instead to look to F-i's
judgment, it could avoid the question of recognizability of a foreign-
nation judgment and the task of testing the F-2 judgment's validity,
finality, and preclusion under foreign law. It should on average
reduce the litigatory load to look to the American judgment rather
than the foreign-nation judgment.
Fourth, it is hard to work up enthusiasm for the proposition
that the foreign-nation judgment is, on average, likely more correct
or otherwise more acceptable than the prior American judgment. The
foreign-nation court probably used different choice-of-law and
substantive doctrines, and employed procedures that probably would
not appeal to us, to come to an inconsistent decision. It is not being
parochial to presume that F-1 produced a decision as likely reliable
as F-2's.
Fifth, going beyond the rationales, independent arguments
against the last-in-time rule exist in this context. Honoring the last-
in-time would be an invitation to forum-shopping among foreign-
nation courts by the F-i loser, who could either sue abroad on the
claim or seek an injunction or declaratory judgment of nonliability.
A last-in-time rule would result in "judgment scrubbing," whereby a
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compliant foreign-nation court could erase the effects of a loss in the
United States. 205 By contrast, domestic forum-shopping is not such a
concern, because full faith and credit stands as a defense to shopping.
Sixth, one purpose of the conflict of laws doctrine is to
enhance the coherence of the country's legal system. 206 In this
situation of conflicting local and foreign judgments, it is not coherent
to treat the judgments as equals. The suggestion here is not for blind
adherence to the American judgment. The suggestion is that a valid
and final American judgment was originally entitled to a certain
respect in American courts, and that the intervening foreign-nation
judgment had no authority to defeat that respect. Nor was the foreign
nation's decision on recognition even focused on that respect. To
repeat, the foreign-nation court is operating under a different
recognition regime. The foreign-nation judgment was not deciding
the respect owed in America, but only respect under the foreign law.
In any event, the American F-3 should feel little motivation to honor
the judgment of a foreign nation that has refused to honor an
American judgment, as they often do.207
Seventh, there is no case law standing in the way of the
United States adopting a rule of local preference. A tricky illustration
of the closest precedents lies in Derr v. Swarek.20 8
The first judgment in Derr came by voluntary dismissal with
prejudice of a Mississippi action by the purchasers of Mississippi
farmland against the German sellers. 20 9 Even though under
Mississippi res judicata law the purchasers' claim was extinguished,
the second judgment came in a suit by the sellers in a German court,
which rejected res judicata to reach the merits of the contract dispute,
granted the sellers a declaratory judgment of nonliability, and
assessed nearly $300,000 in court costs against the purchasers. 2 10 For
the third action, the sellers resorted to the Southern District of
Mississippi to enforce the German judgment for costs. 2 1 1
205. The allusion is to the "judgment laundering" practice of getting a
compliant court to convert a shaky foreign judgment into an unassailable domestic
judgment. CLERMONT, supra note 23, at 436-37.
206. See Hessel E. Yntema, The Objectives of Private International Law, 35
CAN. B. REv. 721, 724, 734-35 (1957) (discussing the view that "the essential
objective is to co-ordinate the incidence of legal systems in conflicts cases").
207. Samuel P. Baumgartner, How Well Do U.S. Judgments Fare in Europe?,
40 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 173, 227-31 (2008).
208. 766 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2014) (2-1 decision).
209. Id. at 435.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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The Derr federal district court rejected the German judgment,
and the court of appeals affirmed. "Because federal jurisdiction was
invoked by way of diversity of citizenship, we apply Mississippi law
governing the recognition of foreign judgments."2 12 In the federal
court of appeals' view, the German court's failure to respect the
purchasers' dismissal with prejudice of their claims against the
sellers violated Mississippi public policy and rendered meaningless
the right of the purchasers to put an end to litigation of their claims.
"As the German declaratory judgment and attendant cost award
issued only because the German court ignored the res judicata effect
of the . . . dismissal with prejudice, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to extend comity to the judgment."213
The Derr facts seem to suggest a slight complication. 2 14 in
one sense, the judgments were consistent, as the purchasers had lost
in both F-I and F-2. 215 But Germany would have decided differently
if it had given the American judgment its claim-preclusive effect.
How then can we refine the rule to empower Mississippi to look at
Mississippi's prior judgment? We need to include this kind of case-
when F-3 wants to look at F-I's judgment to knock out an action
upon F-2's judgment-within the problem of inconsistency.
Inconsistent judgments have to be made to include the situation
where enforcing F-2's judgment in F-3 would defeat the claim
preclusive-effect that F-i's judgment would have under its own res
judicata law.
The Derr federal courts viewed the denial of recognition to
the German judgment as a discretionary decision under Mississippi's
comity-based state law.216 They could go the Mississippi way
because the case's facts of Mississippi (F-1), Germany (F-2), and
Mississippi (F-3) put it outside the reach of any federal compulsion.
In any event, because the federal district court had exercised its
212. Id. at 436.
213. Id. at437.
214. This complication is an additional argument against applying the first-in-
time rule broadly. See supra text accompanying note 36. The last-in-time rule more
simply sidesteps the complication in all but this foreign-nation judgment situation.
See supra text accompanying note 10.
215. The Pierre v. Doug hypothetical presents the same complication. See
supra text accompanying note 175. The first New York judgment and the French
judgment are not inconsistent in all senses, as the New York judgment technically
could not be used for preclusion in the later action upon the French judgment in F-
3. But the New York judgment should have claim-precluded the French action, and
so F-3 would want to escape the last-in-time rule.
216. See Derr, 766 F.3d at 442, 446 (noting that Mississippi has not enacted
the Uniform Act, but it follows the usual public-policy exception to comity).
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discretion against the German judgment, the court of appeals did not
have to decide whether the district court was obliged to disregard the
German judgment, under Mississippi or federal law. 2 17
The ALI believes that the general American law should make
mandatory the denial of recognition to the foreign-nation
judgment.218 In my view too, based on the reasons above, an
American court must disregard a foreign-nation judgment
inconsistent with an American judgment. Whether the foreign-nation
court just ignored the American judgment, correctly rejected it under
the foreign law, or erroneously denied respect under the foreign law,
the American court should look to the American judgment. If the
foreign country was trying to respect the American judgment but
erroneously interpreted American law, that is a tougher call on which
there is no case guidance. Because the line between naked disrespect
and honest mistake could be rather fine and because many of the
arguments for letting the local judgment control still apply, I would
persist in saying the American court must disregard such a foreign-
nation judgment. If, however, the foreign-nation court were,
someday, to become mutually obligated by treaty to give the
equivalent of full faith and credit to an American judgment, the
balance would tip back to the last-in-time rule. 2 19
The ALI simply attributed the mandatory preference for the
local judgment to the Full Faith and Credit Clause and Act. I was less
certain that these provisions address this point. No case has squarely
addressed the point, because the court can duck it by disregarding the
foreign judgment "in its discretion" as the Derr courts did. When the
issue finally arises, I do think that an American court should hold
that the preference is mandatory, at least as a matter of federal
common law. Although the Uniform Act and some other state laws
leave the preference for the local judgment discretionary, the
217. The same issues are currently on appeal in the Fourth Circuit. The
sequence of cases there was District of Maryland, Iraq, District of Maryland. The
federal cases were in diversity, and Maryland is a Uniform Act state. See Iraq
Middle Mkt. Dev. Found. v. Harmoosh, No. 15-CV-01 124, 2016 WL 1242598, at
*8-9 & n.9 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2016) (rejecting Iraqi judgment on another ground),
appealfiled, No. 16-1403 (4th Cir. Filed Apr. 11, 2016).
218. See supra text accompanying note 204.
219. An argument against constitutionalizing the preference for an American
judgment would be that it might hamper our ability to enter into such treaties. See
generally Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85
CORNELL L. REv. 89, 124-27 (1999) (discussing similar constitutional issues in the
context of jurisdiction). But recall that U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1 authorizes
congressional exceptions to full faith and credit. The implementing legislation
could adjust the preference for local judgments.
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mandatoriness of the federal law would override it when that federal
law was applicable interjurisdictionally. If F-2 is a foreign nation and
F-1 and F-3 are the same U.S. state, then state law would govern.
Nonetheless, I ultimately believe that the ALI was right that
mandatoriness flows from the Full Faith and Credit Clause and Act.
The way they work is to require that an American court give full
faith and credit to an American judgment, subject only to narrow
exceptions expressly provided by statute or by rare court decision
based on a national policy. 2 20 In the situation under consideration,
there is only one prior American judgment, and no statute or strong
policy calls for an exception in favor of a last-in-time foreign
judgment, so the Clause and Act impose a first-in-time rule.
CONCLUSION
The current American law on inconsistent judgments
enshrines the last-in-time rule, despite the fact that it is out of step
with the rest of the world's devotion to a broadly applicable first-in-
time rule. Although America's law is a bit imprecise, not even
defining the idea of "inconsistent" judgments, it shows lack of
complete conviction only when the last-in-time judgment loser could
not get review in the U.S. Supreme Court or when a prior domestic
judgment goes toe-to-toe with a subsequent foreign-nation judgment.
It is high time to refine the imprecisions and to resolve the
uncertainties.
To do so, this Article proposes the following "blackletter"
formulation: 22 1
INCONSISTENT JUDGMENTS: When two (or
more) prior judgments would preclude a claim or
issue differently in a subsequent action, the last-in-
time of the prior judgments will be recognized as
controlling on the claim or issue.
If, however, both judgments come from foreign
nations, the flexibility of comity means the last-in-
220. See CLERMONT, supra note 23, at 429-31 (discussing rule of full faith
and credit under "state-state" and "state-federal" situations).
221. See Kasia Solon Cristobal, From Law in Bischletter to "Blackletter
Law," 108 LAw LIBR. J. 181 (2016) (tracing the history of this phrase's meaning
from the off-putting use in law of very black Gothic type to the concise statement
of the basic principles of a legal subject).
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time judgment need not be recognized as
controlling in circumstances that make the first-in-
time resolution appear clearly preferable.
Moreover, in an inconsistency between an
American judgment and a foreign-nation
judgment, including where enforcing the foreign-
nation judgment would defeat the claim-preclusive
effect that the American judgment would have
under its own res judicata law, the foreign-nation
judgment will not be recognized as controlling on
the claim or issue.
This formulation realizes the slight advantages of a last-in-
time approach, while recognizing needed exceptions for treating
foreign-nation judgments. Additionally, it accords with the American
cases, intelligently reread, a case law position to which a goodly
number of Supreme Court cases have pretty much committed us.
Finally, given American law's current exception for foreign-nation
judgments, and recalling the incipient acceptance abroad of waiver as
an exception to their first-in-time rule, it turns out that America and
the rest of the world are not so far apart in the treatment of
inconsistent judgments after all. The consequential irony is that
comparative law, which prompted my questioning of American law,
ultimately reveals convergence and so provides support for the
proposed reformulation.
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